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This research is a framework for understanding issues in modeling the military 
aspect of space, with particular regard to capturing its value.  Space power is a difficult 
and far-reaching topic, with implications that go beyond the military aspects.  The United 
States military increasingly relies on space-based systems and information for success in 
daily operations.  Telecommunications, navigation and timing, intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance, and weather prediction are instances of services that have become 
dependent on satellite systems.  If this reliance on space is not fully understood, U.S. 
national security will be at risk as the result of space information degradation or denial.  
This research effort attempts to break new ground in organizing the interactions and 
interdependencies among space doctrine, space systems, system owner/operators, and 
space-based information users.  An illustrative example, using GPS, is then examined to 
explore the approach.  Analysis of GPS as it affects JDAM accuracy is modeled using the 






ISSUES IN MODELING MILITARY SPACE 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
General Issue 
 The United States, and the world in general, increasingly relies on space-based 
systems.  According to The Commission to Assess United States National Security Space 
Management and Organization (aka, Space Commission), America’s interest in space 
includes the following: 
• Promote the peaceful use of space. 
• Use the nation’s potential in space to support U.S. domestic, economic, 
diplomatic, and national security objectives. 
 
• Develop and deploy the means to deter and defend against hostile acts directed 
at U.S. space assets and against the uses of space hostile to U.S. interests. 
(Space Commission, 2, 7) 
 
Domestic and economic applications of space include navigation and timing, 
weather forecasting, geothermal imaging, pager and cellular service, television, 
telephone, radio, and other forms of communications.  In order to meet national security 
objectives, deter foreign aggression, and defend U.S. interests, the military has more 
specialized uses for satellites.  These include those listed above, as well as a variety of 
intelligence-gathering functions.  These military space-based platforms provide our 
national leaders with the capability to communicate with frontline forces from any point 
on the globe, detect and investigate potential threats to allied forces or nations, pinpoint 
1 
enemy assets for use in munitions targeting, support guidance of precision munitions, and 
deter potential crises from affecting United States or allied national interests via 
intelligence-gathering applications.  As nations and citizens become more technologically 
adept, space-based assets may develop more uses than planned for in their original 
mission design.  This expansion of uses results in an increased reliance by the military, as 
well as society, on space-based technologies.  As this reliance grows, so does our 
vulnerability to attacks on these space-based systems.   
As space products and services become ever more interwoven with our 
nation’s politics, economics, culture, and security, they become an 
increasingly lucrative target for potential adversaries.  With such growing 
dependence, a future foe could gain an advantage by denying, disrupting, 
or destroying our ability to access and use space.  (Long Range Plan, 19)   
 
For example, the use of GPS has grown well beyond its original military 
applications.  GPS is used today to track packages, survey land, aid hikers and hunters in 
land navigation, aid search and rescue personnel in locating lost or injured personnel, and 
a variety of other commercial applications.  Investment banks, cellular companies, 
paging/computer networks, and electrical utilities also use GPS for time synchronization 
(Klotz, 12).  Banks with international branches must have time synchronization among 
their widely dispersed locations to calculate interest and correctly handle various 
transactions.  Paging, cellular, and computer networks all use GPS-based time 
synchronization to communicate electronically.  The Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) uses GPS for its Terminal Doppler Weather Radar system as a reliable time source 
(Houck, 1).  
As society becomes increasingly reliant on space-based technology, questions 
arise concerning our vulnerability to its loss; what happens if a specific technology is 
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unavailable due to natural or man-made intervention?  On March 13, 1989, the largest 
solar flare in half a century caused a magnetic storm that destroyed a power transformer 
in New Jersey and disabled the entire Hydro-Quebec electrical power grid for the 
Province of Quebec, Canada, resulting in a blackout for the entire province (Thompson, 
Reuters).  This same storm also caused increased atmospheric drag in low-earth orbit 
(LEO) resulting in USSPACECOM having to recompute trajectories for about 1,300 
objects (Odenwald).   
A similar solar storm on July 17, 2000 caused minor problems, including the 
disruption of satellite data transfer, resulting in erroneous data from weather satellites 
(GOES-8) (Reuters).  A more recent geomagnetic storm in August 2001 interfered with 
microwave communications, hand-held radiophones, and navigation systems in much of 
Canada and the northern tier of the U.S. (Siegel, 1).  The storm was so intense that the 
Aurora Borealis could be seen as far south as El Paso, Texas.  In addition, the recent 
Leonid meteor shower in mid-November caused concern among astrophysicists that the 
particles entering the near-earth environment might damage satellites (CNN, 1).  Solar 
flare radio noise, solar radiation, and solar flares are listed as potential environmental 
impacts in the Joint Publications (Joint Pub IV-5). 
Unfortunately, satellite disruption is not limited to natural events.  Satellite 
transmissions can be jammed or disrupted like other types of transmissions.  A handheld 
Russian GPS jamming device is powerful enough to disrupt an aircraft’s GPS receiver 
out to 192 kilometers (Space Commission, Ch 2, 20).  Jamming and natural space events 
can have a tremendous affect on civilian and military satellite applications.  Our 
increasing dependence on space-based technology forces us to address the issue of the 
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effects and potential problems if those assets became unavailable.  For instance, how 
would the way we wage war change if a space system (or systems) were degraded or lost 
completely?  To determine the military effectiveness of space, one must know what space 
provides the warfighter and how, when, and where this information is used.  This thesis 
investigates issues in modeling military uses of space, with particular attention given to 
how to begin measuring military effectiveness of space systems.  It applies this method to 
a nominal GPS system as an illustrative demonstration of the method. 
Background 
The Department of Defense (DOD) and various U.S. space agencies are 
concerned with the potential vulnerabilities our nation’s reliance on space-based 
platforms may create.  The Space Commission’s report to Congress indicates the nation’s 
reliance on space assets could potentially lead to a “Space Pearl Harbor” situation (Space 
Commission, Executive Summary, viii).  “We know from history that every medium—
air, land, and sea—has seen conflict.  Reality indicates that space will be no different” 
(Space Commission, Executive Summary, x).  In a series of essays about the future of the 
Chinese military, written by high-ranking Chinese military authorities, space is clearly a 
new dimension in the battlefield.  In fact, many Chinese military leaders support the view 
that future conflicts in space are inevitable and are preparing to meet that reality 
(Pillsbury, Part 4).  Similarly, the Space Commission also states it is vital to national 
security to protect and defend the U.S. and its space assets from hostile action either from 
space or terrestrial forces (Space Commission, Executive Summary, vii).   
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In March 2000, General Eberhart, Commander in Chief, North American 
Aerospace Defense Command  (NORAD); Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command 
(USSPACECOM); and Commander, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), described 
how the failure of one of four MilStar II satellites resulted in a 25% degradation in global 
tactical satellite secure communications capability (Eberhart, 13).  This loss during a time 
of peace caused limited difficulties in tactical communications.  However, in times of 
conflict or during critical military operations, this type of loss could be a crucial 
impediment to mission success and put lives at risk.        
The ability to restrict or deny freedom of access to and operations in space 
is no longer limited to global military powers. Knowledge of space 
systems and the means to counter them is increasingly available on the 
international market. Nations hostile to the U.S. possess or can acquire the 
means to disrupt or destroy U.S. space systems by attacking the satellites 
in space, their communications nodes on the ground and in space, or 
ground nodes that command the satellites.  (Space Commission, 2, 19) 
 
Identifying the critical space technologies the Air Force requires to complete its mission 
is a necessary first step.  It is important to develop a methodology that can explain the 
extent of our dependence on these space assets. 
In the coming period, the U.S. will conduct operations to, from, in, and through 
space in support of its national interests both on earth and in space. As with 
national capabilities in the air, on land, and at sea, the U.S. must have the 
capabilities to defend its space assets against hostile acts and to negate the hostile 
use of space against U.S. interests.  (Space Commission, 2, 13) 
 
CIA Director George Tenet stated in his February 6, 2002 testimony to Congress that 
longstanding U.S. advantages in space surveillance “are eroding as more countries, 
including China and India, field increasingly sophisticated reconnaissance satellites” 
(Walter, 3).  Awareness of these diminishing advantages, increasing interdependencies, 
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and an ability to measure our vulnerability is necessary while we improve methods to 
protect these space assets.   
Air Force Space Command is concerned about the ability to quantify the impact 
of space on warfare and the warfighter.  Some key questions that need to be addressed for 
establishing the military effectiveness of space are:  
• What synergistic effects do satellites provide to mission accomplishment and 
how are these force-multipliers measured?  
 
• Does the loss or degradation of space assets affect putting bombs on target? 
 
• How do we measure damage and degradation in performance of satellites? 
  
• At what point does satellite degradation start affecting mission effectiveness?  
 
• At what points in the peace, pre-conflict, conflict, return-to-peace process is 
space critical?  (Whitsel, 2001)  
 
With respect to conventional operations, battle damage assessment (BDA) is well 
established, even though it may require satellite inputs and verification.  However, with 
respect to information and satellite operations, our assessment of damage to a 
communications network of an enemy or allied intelligence satellite is less established.  
This is due to the nature of the space environment.  It is relatively easy to assess damage 
done to a tank on the battlefield or determine the cause of its failure.  However, when a 
space system fails or stops communicating, the current inaccessibility of space systems 
makes traditional BDA difficult.  Telemetry data or radio emissions are typically more 
helpful in determining the cause of a failure.   
Modeling can aide in the study of system failures or normal operations.  There are 
two ways to study the operations and interactions of a system: experiment with the actual 
system or experiment with a model of the system (Law and Kelton, 4).  Since spacelift 
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systems and payloads are extremely expensive, a methodology is required to imitate and 
experiment with a space-based system.  A clear indication that simulation can be useful 
in determining what space brings to the fight is the following citation from the Space 
Commission.  
The military uses a variety of tools to simulate war-fighting environments 
in support of exercises, experiments, and war games. However, these tools 
have not been modernized to take into account the missions and tasks that 
space systems can perform. As a result, simulation tools cannot be used 
effectively to understand the utility of space-based capabilities on warfare.  
Further, the lack of modeling and simulation tools has prevented military 
commanders from learning how to cope with the loss or temporary 
interruption of key space capabilities, such as the Global Positioning 
System (GPS), satellite communications, remote sensing, or missile 
warning information. To support exercises, experiments and war games, 
the Department must develop and employ modeling and simulation tools 
based on measures of merit and effectiveness that will quantify the effects 
of space-based capabilities.  (Space Commission, xxix) 
 
Not only is modeling and simulation useful, it is required according to 
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD).  PDD-NSC-49/NSTC-8, National Space Policy, 
as implemented by Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3100.10, Space Policy, 
July 1999, which states: 
Space capabilities and applications shall be integrated into campaign-level 
and other models and simulations. Models and simulations shall focus on 
demonstrating the military worth and other value of both friendly and 
adversary space capabilities and applications to mission accomplishment.  
(Space Policy, 12) 
  
Understanding and organizing doctrine and mission functionality of our various 
space-based systems, what they do, and how they interact is necessary to accurately 
model these systems.   
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Problem Statement 
The purpose of this thesis is to take an initial step in clarifying issues in modeling 
the military effectiveness of space.  This first step involves a review of available open-
source literature in order to determine the current state of the art in modeling space assets.  
This requires a review of how space is handled in various combat models and 
simulations. The next step is the development of a general form of measuring the 
effectiveness of a system.  This methodology is then applied to a nominal GPS example 
to determine its validity.    
Research Approach 
The research objective of this thesis was to develop an initial methodology 
AFSPC can use to aid in modeling the military effectiveness of space.  To do this, the 
influences and interactions of the space systems, the command and control structures, and 
the end users of the information these systems provide must be understood.  Current 
capabilities in the modeling and simulation of space systems also must be evaluated.  An 
understanding of the various primary, secondary, tertiary, and other dimensional 
interactions is essential for modeling the various space systems.   
A hierarchy was developed of the various responsibilities space systems have on 
the Air Force mission.  These mission responsibilities are then further reduced to analyze 
actual system functions using modeling and simulation.  We apply our methodology to 
catalogue space assets’ various missions, functions, and interactions.  Additionally, our 
approach will help identify the customers using these systems, the purpose of the system, 
and a determination of the military worth.   
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Scope/Limitations 
This research will look at the interactions between a space system’s 
functionality and its mission requirements using open-source data.  The analysis 
of the particular space system (GPS) is notional since it is based on open-source 
information and limited to an unclassified level.  GPS has an important mission 
and provides key functionality to the warfighter.  This example will provide an 
understanding of how space systems influence the military mission—a key step 
toward defining the system’s military worth.   
Outline of Thesis 
In Chapter II, a review of relevant literature with respect to space systems, 
doctrine, responsibility matrices, and project management is presented.  In 
Chapter III, a coherent methodology is developed for understanding how the 
functionality and mission requirements of space systems interact.  In Chapter IV, 
an application of the methodology using the GPS system and its relation to the 
warfighter is presented.  The thesis concludes with a recommendation for future 
related research projects. 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews open-source literature dealing with international law, U.S. 
policy, Department of Defense and Air Force doctrine, long-range planning, space 
operations and systems, and project management.  The purpose of this chapter is to gain 
an understanding, at the open-source level, about the mission and functionality of space-
based systems, how they are used, how they interact, and what limitations exist.   
International Law 
To establish the military worth of space, the current limits on the military use of 
space must be understood.  International law, international treaties, and national policy 
place limits on military uses of space.  Prohibited activities include: nuclear weapon 
testing in space, the delivery of weapons of mass destruction from space, and offensive 
operations from space.  These documents also prohibit claims of sovereignty by a nation 
on any celestial body or extraterrestrial territory.  Table 1, taken from the Air Force 
Space Handbook, highlights the key areas in international law or treaties limiting the 
military use of space.  The U.S. maintains the right to carry out actions in space not 












-  Made applicable to Space by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 
-  Prohibits states from threatening to use, or actually using, force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of another state (Article 2(4)) 




-  Bans nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. 
-  States may not conduct nuclear weapon tests or other nuclear explosions (i.e., peaceful nuclear 




-  Outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, 
use, occupation, or other means (Article 11).  
-  Space activities shall be conducted in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter 
(Article III).  
-  The Moon and other celestial bodies are to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes (Article IV) 
and free for use by all states (Article 1). 
-  Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (such as chemical and biological 
weapons) may not be placed in orbit, installed on celestial bodies, or stationed in space in any 
other manner (Article IV).  
-  A state may not conduct military maneuvers: establish military bases, fortifications, or 
installations; or test any type of weapon on celestial bodies. Use of military personnel for 
scientific research or other peaceful purpose is permitted (Article IV).  
-  States are responsible for governmental and private space activities, and must supervise and 
regulate private activities (Article IV).  
-  States are internationally liable for damage to another state (and its Citizens) caused by its space 
objects (including privately owned ones) (Article VII).  
-  States retain jurisdiction and control over space objects while they are in space or on celestial 
bodies (Article VII).  
-  States must conduct international consultations before proceeding with activities that would cause 
potentially harmful interference with activities of other parties (Article IX).  
-  States must carry out their use and exploration of space in such a way as to avoid harmful 
contamination of outer space, the Moon, and other celestial bodies, as well as to avoid the 
introduction of extraterrestrial matter that could adversely affect the environment of the Earth 
(Article IX).  
-  Stations, installations, equipment, and space vehicles on the Moon and other celestial bodies are 






Dec 13, 2001 
U.S. withdraw 
from the ABM 
Treaty (Bush) 
-  Between the US and USSR. 
-  Prohibits development, testing, or deployment of space-based ABNI systems or components 
(Article V).  
-  Prohibits deployment of ABM systems or components except as authorized in the treaty (Article 
I).  
-  Prohibits interference with the national technical means a party uses to verify compliance with the 




-  A launching site is absolutely liable for damage by its space object to people or property on the 
Earth or in its atmosphere (Article II).  
-  Liability for damage caused by a space object, to persons or property on board such a space 




-  Requires a party to maintain a registry of objects it launches into Earth orbit or beyond (Article II). 
-  Information of each registered object must be furnished to the UN as soon as practical, including 





-  Prohibits military or other hostile use of environmental modification techniques as a means of 
destruction, damage, or injury to any other state if such use has widespread, long-lasting, or severe 
effects (Article I). 
Source: Space Handbook, Vol. I, 55 
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These limitations are specific and still allow for a broad use of space. By not 
expressly denying its use in space, “international law implicitly permits the performance 
of traditional military functions as surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, meteorology, 
and communications” (Space Handbook I, 57).  Activities that are permitted include 
nonnuclear, non-ABM, conventional space-to-ground weapons and anti-satellite 
weapons.  These uses of space by the military may be limited by U.S. national policy 
objectives, however.  “Currently, there are no force application assets operating in space, 
but technology and national policy could change so that force application missions could 
be performed from platforms operating in space” (AFDD 2-2, 19). 
 The recent withdrawal by the United States from the 1972 ABM Treaty illustrates 
how national policy can change with respect to the military uses of space.  Based on 
openly available information, no force application assets for any nation are currently 
operating in space. 
National Space Policy 
In 2000, Congress created the Space Commission.  The Space Commission’s 
charter was to assess the (Space Commission, Ch 1, 2): 
• Exploitation of military space assets to support U.S. operations. 
 
• Interagency coordination of national security space assets. 
 
• Professional military education institutions’ role in military space issues.  
 
• The potential costs and benefits of: 
 
o Merging intelligence and non-intelligence aspects of national security space. 
 
o An independent national security space mission department and military 
service. 
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o A national security space mission corps within the Air Force.  
 
o A position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space.  
 
o A new program or budget mechanism to manage national security space.  
 
o Any other change to existing DOD organizational structure for national 
security space management and organization. 
 
Congress amended the Space Commission’s charter in 2001, to include the following 
additional elements (Space Commission, 1, 2):  
• Flag officers must have space, missile, or information operations experience. 
 
• CINC SPACECOM must be rotated among the services. 
 
• Removal of flight rating requirement for key officer positions. 
   
These tasks form a comprehensive and far reaching understanding into how space is and 
should be used, organized, and managed by the Department of Defense, intelligence 
communities, civilian, and commercial organizations.  Prior to the Space Commission, 
the arrangement and management of space did not provide a clear and focused attention 
to space (Space Commission, 2, 9).  The Space Commission recommended several 
changes in the space organizational structure giving space a cabinet-level voice, clearer 
accountability, and responsibility.  The result of the Space Commission study is a greater 
emphasis on the role space has in national security.  In addition, the Space Commission 
recommended (Space Commission, 6, 90): 
• Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) should be assigned responsibility for 
providing the resources to execute space research, development, acquisition, 
and operations, under the command of a four-star general. The Army and Navy 
would still establish requirements and develop and deploy space systems 




• Amend Title 10 U.S.C. to assign the Air Force responsibility to organize, train, 
and equip for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air and space 
operations. In addition, the Secretary of Defense should designate the Air 
Force as Executive Agent for Space within the Department of Defense. 
 
The recent promotion and subsequent reassignment of General Lance Lord as 
Commander of AFSPC, together with the realignment of the Space and Missile Systems 
Center (SMC) from Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) to AFSPC, provides a clear 
indication that the Space Commission’s recommendations are being implemented. 
Other important policy and planning documents include: the National Security 
Space Master Plan, DOD Space Policy, Joint Vision 2020, USSPACECOM Long Range 
Plan, and the AFSPC Strategic Master Plan. 
Military Doctrine 
Where policy is a plan or a course of action, “doctrine is a tool to translate 
national policy into military forces and employment strategy” (Newberry, 3).  Table 2 
highlights several differences between policy and doctrine.  Table 2 clearly demonstrates 
the emphasis of doctrine on military effectiveness or worth.   
 
Table 2.  Policy versus Doctrine 
Item Policy Doctrine 
Source Civilian Authorities Military Leadership 
Emphasis Politically Derived Military Effectiveness 
Responsiveness Quick Slow, Incremental 
Duration Short Long 
 
  Source: Newberry, 9 
 
Joint doctrine is a necessary capstone requirement before any service-level 
doctrine can be established (Newberry, 5).  However, in the absence of Joint doctrine on 
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space, the Air Force developed Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-2, Space 
Operations, in 1998.  This was the first space doctrine developed in the seven years since 
Air Force Manual 1-6, Military Space Doctrine, was rescinded in 1991.  Joint doctrine 
for space during this time was non-existent until publication of a draft of Joint 
Publication 3-14, Joint Doctrine: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Space 
Operations, in 1999.  Without an officially approved joint doctrine, the military worth of 
space becomes less tangible and more difficult to assess.   
Joint Pub 3-14 is currently under development by USSPACECOM.  In its first 
draft, version dated January 1999, the space doctrine focus is on four mission areas: space 
control, force application, space support, and force enhancement  (Joint Pub 3-14, vi).   
The space control mission is composed of three functional areas: protection, 
prevention, and negation.  Protection consists of both active and passive defensive 
measures to safeguard space-based assets from natural or man-made interference. 
Prevention is a form of deterrence through economic, diplomatic, or political means to 
avoid a hostile nation’s use of space-based systems.  Negation refers to measures to 
deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy an enemy’s space systems and services (Joint 
Pub 3-14, III-5). 
Force application and space control, together, account for combat operations in 
space.  Force application is the true offensive role in space and involves the employment 
of weapons targeting air, land, sea, or other space forces.  Current national policy 
constrains the use of force from space.  Future force application functions may consist of 
power projection, terrestrial defense, and ballistic missile defense (BMD) (Joint Pub 3-
14, III-12, GL-8).  
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Space support represents the logistical footprint required to operate space 
systems.  Spacelift/launch, satellite operations (telemetry, tracking, & commanding or 
TT&C), and space surveillance are the functional areas of space support (Joint Pub, III-
11).  Spacelift and launch refer to operations associated with delivering a system into 
orbit.  TT&C refers to the actual control of a system while it is in orbit.  Space 
surveillance is a support function for tracking, identifying, and cataloging any and all 
items in orbit in support of launch operations (Joint Pub 3-14, III-11).  This important 
function is used to support the placement of future systems into orbit, identify potential 
threats, and avoid collision with existing systems or space debris  (Joint Pub 3-14, III- 4). 
The Force enhancement mission is a combat support mission.  The various 
functional areas provide situational awareness to the warfighter.  Because of this 
situational awareness, the force enhancement mission has the most direct impact on the 
warfighter (Joint Pub 3-14, III- 8). The functional areas for force enhancement are: 
surveillance and reconnaissance, environmental monitoring, communications, 
imagery/global geospatial information and services, and navigation and timing.   
Surveillance and reconnaissance provides the combatant commander intelligence 
on troop disposition, location, and intention.  Surveillance and reconnaissance also 
provides early attack warning, targeting analysis, BDA, and COA opportunities (Joint 
Pub 3-14, App A).  This allows the commander a greater variety of options when 
employing forces; e.g., tactics can be selected to give friendly forces a great advantage 
(Joint Pub 3-14, App A). 
Environmental monitoring provides commanders with meteorological, 
oceanographic, and space environmental data.  Weather forecast data is useful for 
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mission planning, targeting and weapon selection, timing, BDA and communications.  
Oceanographic data provides surface commanders with surface condition, swell height, 
depth, and water current information (Joint Pub 3-14, App B).  
Communications are essential for command and control of forces in wartime and 
peacetime operations.  With increased reliance on technologically advanced weapons, 
data transfer requirements will only increase.  Video and audio communications provide 
necessary information to warfighters and mission planners.  Satellite communications 
provide quick and secure communications at all levels of command from troops in the 
field to the combatant commander to the President and Secretary of Defense National 
Command Authority (Joint Pub 3-14, App C).   
Imagery/global geospatial information and services provide “information on 
terrain, surface trafficability, oceanic subsurface conditions, beach conditions, and 
vegetation” (Joint Pub 3-14, App D).  With this information, mission planners can 
identify specific avenues of approach, ingress/egress routes, and other mission 
requirements.  
Navigation and timing provide very accurate three-dimensional location, velocity, 
and timing information to the warfighter.  This is essential for today’s precision-guided 
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Figure 1.  Space Mission and Functional Elements 
 
Figure 1 graphically represents the mission and functional elements of space 
according to draft Joint Publication 3-14.  These military uses of space fulfill basic 
information collection processes that were once only gathered by spies or scout troops.  
This information is required to successfully plan military operations.  Sun Tzu wrote, 
“Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered.  Know the 
ground, know the weather; your victory will then be total” (Huang, 13).    Joint space 
doctrine is organized to aid in the collection and identification of this type of information 
to help carry out operational missions. 
According to Joint Publication 3-14, USSPACECOM is the “single military 
organization responsible for military space operations” (Joint Pub 3-14, vi).  As such, 
USSPACECOM’s mission as a unified combatant command is to coordinate the use of 
space control, force application, space support, force enhancement, computer network 
defense, and computer network attack among the Army, Navy, and Air Force Space 
Commands.  The first four missions are identical to the missions directed under Joint 
Publication 3-14.  The two additional mission areas deal with the defense of and attack on 
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information, computers, and networks in terms of disruption, denial, degradation, or 
destruction. 
AFSPC is the Air Force’s major command responsible for providing trained space 
forces to USSPACECOM, and trained ICBM forces to the U.S. Strategic Command 
(USSTRATCOM).  As the Executive Agent for Space, the AFSPC mission is to defend 
the United States through the control and exploitation of space.  This mission is further 
divided into the four areas of space control, force application, space support, and force 
enhancement.  While CINC USSPACECOM has also filled the role as CINC NORAD 
and AFSPC/CC, the Space Commission recommends discontinuing this practice.  By 
separating AFSPC from USSPACECOM, CINC USSPACECOM can focus on long-term 
joint space issues and divorce himself from nearer term AFSPC issues (Space 
Commission, 6, 89).  
Service-level doctrine should be more operational in scope than joint doctrine.  
“Space systems and capabilities enhance the precision, lethality, survivability, and agility 
of all operations—air, land, sea, and special operations” (AFDD 2-2, 3).    These 
operational enhancement functions are similar to those assigned for airpower.  The four 
functional areas listed in AFDD 2-2, are space control, application of force, enhancing 
operations, and supporting space forces.  These areas directly correspond to those 
functions mentioned in joint doctrine. Some nominal operational power capabilities 





Table 3.  Nominal Space Capabilities 
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Source: AFDD 2-2, Appendix A 
 
These space capabilities are employed throughout peacetime, escalation, conflict, 
and post hostilities (AFDD 2-2, 29).  Figure 2 reflects how the realm of information 








Figure 2.  Space Employment Concepts 
 
Space assets provide a significant proportion of the military’s current information 
superiority capabilities via the mission functions already mentioned.  The information 
provided by space is critical to decision makers and can provide global awareness and 
possibly diplomatic or political advantage that allows us to effectively respond to crises 
(AFDD 2-2, 29).  This adds a dimension of time into the worth of space.  Space provides 
both long-term and short-term benefits.  Satellite imagery is crucial to both mission 
planning and execution.  Intelligence gathering of possible future targets is a critical long-
term role filled by space systems.  Imagery of post-strike targets (BDA) is a critical short-
term role by space systems.  
Modeling and Simulation 
In order to effectively model the military aspects of space, the interaction of space 
systems and their components, the performance of these components, and the users of 
these space systems must to be studied.  Figure 3 illustrates various ways a system may 
be studied (Law & Kelton, 4).  Modeling and simulation provides a capability for 
studying these interactions. 
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The first choice is to decide to experiment with the actual system or with a model 
of that system.  A major factor in this decision is if it is cost-effective to modify the 
actual system (Law, 4).  Another key factor is that in some cases, there is no real way 
(short of war) to test some systems.  For example, for modifications to an existing 
airframe, it may be relatively simple to modify the airframe and test during flight-testing.  
However, if a new aircraft design is proposed, modeling the airframe in a wind tunnel 














Source:  Law, Figure 1.1 
Figure 3.  Ways to Study a System 
 
The next choice is whether a physical model or mathematical model is required.  
A physical model is one in which a scaled replica of the system of interest is created and 
studied.  A mathematical model represents a system by logical or quantitative measures 
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that can be altered and studied (Law, 5).  To study the aerodynamics of an aircraft, a 
small-scale model in a wind tunnel may be sufficient.  To study the astrodynamics of a 
spacecraft, a mathematical model incorporating orbital mechanics may be more valid. 
Finally, an analytic solution or simulation solution should be obtained.  An 
analytic solution can be obtained through calculation of the mathematical model.   
If not all variables are known or the problem is too complex for an analytic 
solution, simulation can be employed to numerically exercise the mathematical model 
(Law, 5). Figure 4 illustrates a series of steps that must be applied in order to have a 
sound simulation study.  A description of these steps is found in Appendix A. 
Construct a computer
program and verify 
Formulate problem 
and plan the study
Collect data and 



























Source:  Law, Figure 1.68 
Figure 4.  Steps in a Simulation Study 
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The use of modeling and simulation is well established within the DOD 
community.  There are several levels of simulation in the area of combat modeling, as 
shown in Figure 5.  System- or engineering-level models found at the base of the pyramid 
model the individual characteristics of a system.  Engagement-level models attempt to 
assess a system’s performance (e.g., probability of kill) against an adversary system in a 
“one on one” engagement.  Mission-level models are “one vs. many” or “many vs. many” 
battle models that attempt to measure the operational performance of the system(s).  
Theater or campaign models attempt to represent the entire military operations of a war 
including ground, sea, and air components.   
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According to Presidential Decision Directive NSC-49, modeling is the approved 
method to demonstrate the effectiveness of a space system.  It will be important to 
 determine how space is currently modeled (PDD-NSC-49/NSTC-8).  There are too many 
models in existence to review in detail in this research.  Therefore, the major Theater-
level models are reviewed.  The first model, the Integrated Theater Engagement Model 
(ITEM), simulates warfare across a wide spectrum of conflict from the individual unit 
level to a major regional conflict.  The second model, Tactical Warfare (TACWAR), is a 
Joint model used to simulate 2 sided theater level combat.  THUNDER is a stochastic, 
two-sided, analytical simulation of campaign-level military operations sponsored by the 
Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency (AFSAA) and currently is the primary Air Force 
tool for evaluating the contributions of air and space systems (AFMSRR).  Strategic and 
Theater Operations Research Model (STORM) is the replacement to Thunder.  The 
Extended Air Defense Simulation (EADSIM) assesses the effectiveness of Theater 
Missile Defense (TMD) and air defense systems against the full spectrum of extended air 
defense threats (SMDC). The final model reviewed is a new model being developed, the 
Joint Warfare System (JWARS), is based in joint doctrine and will be capable of 
representing future warfare; and aid in force structure analysis, acquisition analysis, and 
CINC course of action analysis (JWARS).  Table 4 displays how each of these models 
represent the various space missions within the simulation.  In addition, Appendix B 
provides a review of simulations that model the various Space, Missile Warning, and/or 
Information Operation functions.   
The System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation (SEAS) is an entity-based, time-
stepped, stochastic, multimission-level model designed to help evaluate the military 
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utility of airborne and space-based communications and ISR assets (Rand, 53).  This high 
fidelity model represents the specific mission level requirements of airborne and space 
based communications and ISR.  Target Prioritization for Links & Nodes (TPT-LN) 
{Formerly SIAM) analyzes information flow on the battlefield to determine effects-based 
target priorities and information degradation from weapon use.  (Aegis).  It models a 
series of networks consisting of sensors and shooters and the paths that connect them.  In 
contrast to the theater level models displayed in Table 4, these high fidelity models 
represent a specific aspect of space relatively well.  Space is not well represented among 
the theater level models as is evident by Table 4.  However, space is well represented in 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































What is lacking is an understanding of how to aggregate these system level 
models represented in Appendix B into relevant theater and global level effects for use in 
lower fidelity models.  Figure 6 visually portrays this lack of intermediate level of 
representation of space in modeling.  A way of organizing the relevant mission details 
and effects of a space system into several levels of fidelity is required.   





System High Well defined
Figure 6.  Fidelity Issues in Space Modeling 
 
GPS Interference and Navigation Tool (GIANT) 
“GIANT is a one versus many constructive and repeatable simulation used to 
determine GPS and Inertial Navigation System (INS) performance and weapon system 
operational effectiveness as a function thereof in a GPS interference environment” 
(Veridian, 1).  GIANT was conceived and developed for the GPS Joint Program Office 
Navwar Program (Veridian, 5).  GIANT is controlled and operated by the Space and 
Missile Systems Center at Los Angeles AFB, California.  GIANT is capable of 
representing air and ground vehicles with or without weapons.  Both the launcher and the 
weapon have GPS/INS navigation systems and the launcher to weapon handoff event is 
modeled (Veridian, 3). As an option, any number probability of kill is thus traceable to 
the weapon and the launcher (McLagan, 5).  GIANT is a validated and accredited model 
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and is included in the Air Force Systems Analysis Toolkit (AFSAT).of stationary or 
moving GPS jammers can be present. Target miss distance and  
Project Management 
Project Management is a process in which a structured, detailed planning, and 
implementation strategy is incorporated for obtaining an organization goal or goals 
(Nicholas, 19).  The U.S. military uses project management in the acquisition process of 
new systems. “It (Project Management) is often associated with early missile and space 
programs of the 1960s” (Nicholas, 24).  In procuring or developing a new system there 
are many different processes that are taking place.  Managers must employ a strategy to 
control the performance of a diverse group of people and skills required in order to 
complete a project on time and within an allotted budget (Milton, 15-19).  This is 





Source:  Rosenau, 16 
Figure 7.  Three dimensions of project goals 
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Project management attempts to organize activities into five functions of 
management: Planning, Organizing, Leadership, Control, and Change.  “The practice of 
project management pays attention to goal-oriented systems, subsystems, their 
relationships, and environment; this is what makes project management a systems 
approach to management” (Nicholas, 21).  The planning function focuses on “setting 
organizational goals and establishing means for achieving them consistent with available 
resources and forces in the environment” (Nicholas, 19).  In other words, the planning 
process establishes “what needs to be done, how it has to be done, by whom, in what 
order, for how much, and by when” (Nicholas, 160).  
The Organizing function deals with three areas of responsibility.  The first is to 
train and manage personnel into a system of authority, responsibility, and accountability. 
The second is to acquire and allocate facilities, materials, and capital.  The final 
responsibility is to organize the above into a suitable structure that includes policies 
procedures, and communication channels (Nicholas, 19).   
Leadership involves the direction and motivation of personnel to obtain 
organizational goals.  For most leaders, the influencing of individual or group 
performance is a primary concern (Nicholas, 20).   
Control represents the quality of the project.  Performance measures of 
effectiveness or efficiency are assessed and any corrective action is taken (Nicholas, 20). 
Change simply encapsulates the dynamics involved in any major project.  Change 
can affect project schedules, goals, timetables, and/or responsibilities. 
Within the Planning phase, an array of tools is used to help organize the work, 
responsibilities, and goals within the project.  These tools include: Work Breakdown 
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Structure (WBS), the Responsibility Matrix, Key Events and Milestones, Gantt Charts, 
networks, decision analysis, critical path analysis, cost estimating, budgeting, and 
forecasting.   
The purpose of the WBS is to “reduce the project into work elements that are so 
clearly defined that they, individually, can be thoroughly and accurately defined, 
budgeted, scheduled, and controlled” (Nicholas, 165).  The level of breakdown is 
dependent on the project and varies between projects.  Figure 8 depicts the hierarchical 
elements of a WBS (Nicholas, Figure 6-1, 166).  These elements are broken down into 
manageable pieces called work packages (Nicholas, 165).  The level of decomposition is 










































Source:  Nicholas, 166 
Figure 8.  WBS Elements 
 
The WBS organizes what needs to be done.  By combining the WBS with a 
structured organization chart the responsibility matrix is created (Nicholas, 175).  This 
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matrix or chart allows the management of work packages and by assigning responsibility 
in an effective manner.  Figure 9 depicts a simple responsibility matrix consisting of a 
single work package and functional position (Nicholas, Figure 6-7, 175).   
 



























P  Primary responsibility
S  Secondary responsibility
N  Must be notified























Figure 9.  Simple Responsibility Matrix 
 
The responsibility matrix not only shows the level of the organization that is 
responsible for a function, it also shows who or what will be impacted by a change in a 
work package design or schedule.  The matrix, combined with other tools, allows the 
project manager to track effects of various changes in work packages on other work 
packages, which may or may not be under the direct control of the manager of the work 
package undergoing a plan change.  Tracking these primary and secondary effects is 
critical to identifying effects and benefits. 
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Global Positioning System 
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a system nominally consisting of 24 
military satellites that provide continues global positioning, navigation and timing 
information (SMC, 1).  These satellites transmit a signal that can be processed by a 
receiver that then computes position, velocity, and time within an amount of error.   
The error is caused by several factors.  The space and atmospheric environments 
account for most of the errors in GPS positioning since Selective Availability (SA) was 
discontinued.  SA is the intentional degradation incorporated into the civilian signal by 
the military.  SA was discontinued due to increasing civilian demand for more accurate 
positioning and navigation information.   
GPS provides two separate signal codes, the Precise Positioning Service (PPS) 
and the Standard Positioning Service (SPS) (NAVSTAR, 1).  The SPS signal 
communicates on the C/A (Coarse Acquisition) code while the PPS signal communicates 
on the P(Y) (Precise (encrypted) code.  Table 5 details the PPS and SPS accuracy 
indicated in the 1999 Federal Radionavigation Plan and the SPS Signal Specification 
document. 
Table 5.  GPS Accuracy 
 
 SPS (SA off) SPS (SA on) PPS (Worst Case) 1999 FRP PPS (CJCS) 
Horizontal Error ≤ 13 meters (SIS only) ≤ 100 meters (SIS only) ≤ 6.3 meters ≤ 22 meters (17.8 meters) 
Vertical Error ≤ 22 meters (SIS only) ≤ 156 meters (SIS only) ≤ 13.6 meters ≤ 27.7 meters 
Time Transfer Error 40 Nanoseconds 340 Nanoseconds 20 Nanoseconds 100 Nanoseconds 
All statistics at 95% Confidence Interval:  Actual position will be within the error listed above 95% of the time. 
Sources:  1999 FRP, C-6; GPS SPS Signal Specifics, 15; NAVSTAR, 1; Chairmen, D-3; HQ AFSPC, 3-17 
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The GPS is composed of three segments; a space segment (space vehicle(s)), a 
control segment (ground stations) and a user segment (personnel or systems in the field) 
(HQ AFSPC, 3, 1).  The control segment consists of five Monitor Stations located in 
Hawaii, Kwajalein, Ascension Island, Diego Garcia and Colorado Springs (NAVSTAR, 
2).  There are three ground antennas also located at Ascension Island, Diego Garcia, and 
Kwajalien (NAVSTAR, 3).  The Master Control Station (MCS) is located at Schriever 
AFB.  The monitor stations track all satellites in view, accumulate and process ranging 
data to determine satellite orbits and to update each satellite's navigation message (Dias, 
3).  This updated information is then transmitted to each satellite via the Ground 
Antennas.  User segments then receiver position, velocity, and time information from the 





















1. Master Control Station 
2. Ground Antenna 
3. Monitor Station 
4. Back-up MCS 
Source:  HQ AFSPC, Figure 3-1 
Figure 10.  The Global Positioning System 
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The original purpose for GPS was to aide in the tracking of ballistic missiles.  
Today, “the primary mission of the GPS is to provide precise, all-weather, three-
dimensional position, velocity and time (PVT) information to an unlimited number of 
properly equipped military and civil users in the air and space and on the land and sea” 
(HQ AFSPC, 1, 1).  An additional mission of the Space Vehicle (SV) the GPS is attached 
to is to provide national warning of nuclear detonations via the Nuclear Detonation 
(NUDET) Detection System (NDS) (HQ AFSPC, 1, 1).  The NDS is a complementary 
payload on the GPS bus.  However, for this research it is considered a separate system 
that must be studied in a similar fashion.  GPS is used by the military in peacetime and in 
wartime operations. 
GPS wartime navigation support applications include en route navigation, 
low level navigation, target acquisition, close air support, missile 
guidance, command and control, all-weather air drop, sensor 
emplacement, precision survey, instrument approach, rendezvous, 
coordinate bombing, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations, search 
and rescue, reconnaissance, range instrumentation, and mine 
emplacement.  GPS provides precise time transfer support to the 
warfighter by synchronizing distributed and diverse battlefield sensors and 
communications systems.  (HQ AFSPC 1, 1) 
 
In addition to the military, civil organizations, foreign organizations, and 
individuals use the PVT information as well.  Civilian and International use of GPS 
makes GPS unique for a military system, as it is one of the few military system also used 
by civilian and foreign organizations. 
Civil navigation applications include intercontinental en route navigation, 
vehicle monitoring, oceanic and coastal navigation, harbor operations, 
resource exploration, hydrographic and geophysical surveying, position 
reporting and monitoring, and coordinating search operations.  The GPS 
precise time transfer mission is vital to synchronizing a growing number 
of distributed civil utilities including electrical, sewage, water and 
telecommunications. (HQ AFSPC, 1, 2) 
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GPS is operated by the Department of Defense (DoD) and managed by the 
Interagency GPS Executive Board (IGEB) (HQ AFSPC, 1, 1).  Figure 11 displays the 
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Figure 11.  GPS Management Structure 
 
As indicated by Figure 11, the GPS military satellite constellation is managed by 
an interagency organization that allows representation of the major users of GPS service.  
As owner, operator, and maintainer of the GPS system, the Department of Defense 
provides policy direction to USSPACECOM.  USSPACECOM provides support to other 
Unified CINCs and external user agencies via the 14th Air Force and the 50th Space Wing.  
DoD assigned the GPS Support Center (GSC) as the lone focal point for operational 
issues and military matters relating to GPS (GSC). Additionally, the GSC is US Space 
Command’s interface to the US Coast Guard’s Navigation Center (NAVCEN) and 
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Federal Aviation Administration’s National Operations Control Center (NOCC) (GSC).  
The NAVCEN represents the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Civil GPS Service 
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Source:  HQ AFSPC, 2, 3 
Figure 12.  GPS Command Organization Structure 
 
The 1st Space Operations Squadron provides GPS support during launch, Low 
Earth Orbit (LEO) transfer, and disposal phases (HQ AFSPC, 2, 4).  The GSC and the 2nd 
Space Operations Squadron are responsible for day-to-day command and control, space 
segment maintenance, anomaly resolution, navigation and time transfer, nuclear 
detonation detection missions of the GPS satellite constellation, and space support to 
warfighters through GPS Performance Prediction and Mission Planning, and GPS 
Enhanced Theater Support (HQ AFSPC, 2, 4).  The GCS also interacts with the civil 
users of GPS. 
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III.  MODELING AND ANALYSIS 
 
Introduction 
Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) requires a methodology to consider 
modeling and measuring the military space.  As the military services become increasingly 
dependent on civil and commercial space systems for mission planning and situational 
awareness of the battlefield, a methodology needs to be developed and understood 
(AFDD 2-2, 14).  Figure 13 outlines the proposed framework to aid in the determination 
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Figure 13.  Proposed Methodology 
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Determination of Space Mission 
The first step in determining the modeling of military space is to understand what 
Space provides to military operations.  This includes long-term and short-term impacts 
space has on the warfighter and basic military operations during peacetime and in 
wartime.  Understanding what support, information, and functions a single space system 
provides in every phase of operations is fundamental to modeling its use and 
effectiveness.  This information can be found in relevant Joint and Service level doctrine, 
and Concept of Operations (CONOPS) documents.  Research from service schools (Air 
Command and Staff Collage, Air War College) and academic institutions can be 
invaluable sources of information, highlighting the future of space missions.  Doctrine is 
essential for the determination of military effectiveness as mentioned in Chapter II.  In 
addition to specific doctrine, system experts, system users, System Program Offices, and 
senior leadership guidance are areas for information of space system missions. 
Each space system has a primary mission (or missions) for which it was built.  
After a system is commissioned, secondary and tertiary missions are added as new uses 
for a space system are discovered.  These ancillary uses, while not initially intended when 
the system was designed, must be considered when modeling the military system.   
In order to capture the primary and ancillary missions of a space system a mission 
organization format is required.  The work breakdown structure (WBS), adapted from 
project management, can be used to capture the interactions of a space system.  The 
mission of each of the space system segments may be viewed through a modified WBS; a 
mission breakdown structure (MBS).  This structure is similar to an organization chart 
listing all the appropriate mission functions relating to the space system of interest.  
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Ideally, every principle or material mission must be captured in this process in order to 
model the space systems.  Unfortunately, this might not be realistic as this process is 
extremely time consuming and space systems are used at an increasing rate.  Clearly, 
critical missions must be identified and understood.  Once these missions have been 
identified, it becomes easier to highlight any interactions that exist between other systems 
and users and what is required to be modeled.  It is these interactions that help determine 
the military effectiveness of the space system.  It is a recommendation of this study that 
such information be tracked and provided in a multiple classification level database.  
Such data will ease the modeling of space assets and activities. 
Tracking of Space Mission Users 
The next step in the framework is to identify and track the various long-term and 
short-term key users or user classes of the space systems using the MBS as a guide.  
Again, due to the sheer volume of users, this may not be a realistic goal at the high 
fidelity level.  Identification of the effects of the space system on critical users is 
necessary.  Adapting the responsibility matrix from project management will allow 
AFSPC to identify and track the critical and secondary users and missions a space system 
supports.  As the primary and ancillary missions grow, new users classes can be 
identified and tracked, highlighting areas for continued study.  By tracking both space 
system missions and its users, an understanding of how space affects military operations 
will be gained.  By representing the interactions in an organized and thorough manner, 
assessment of military effectiveness can be studied.  This may help to identify important 
interactions that can be further investigated.  Recall that the military may not be the only 
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user of a particular space system.  Civilians, corporations, and many foreign countries use 
the information provided by several U.S. space systems, not just the GPS example given 
in Chapter I.  The reliance on this information infrastructure by civilian institutions and 
corporations is also important in determining military worth.  The U.S. Military exists to 
defend the United States and its people, which include its civilian infrastructure.  When 
considering the military worth of space, it may be relevant to measure the military worth 
of civilian space systems and civilian use of military systems as well.  Such information 
should be organized into a database and kept up to date.  As missions are added or 
deleted, the mission breakdown structure with the primary and ancillary effects should be 
tracked or examined inside the responsibility matrix.  Any modeling and measurement of 
military space will gain the knowledge of these interaction affects.  Of course, as with all 
modeling, it will be necessary to identify the key “drivers’ for the analysis under 
consideration. 
Develop Measures of Effectiveness 
Classic Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) exist for most weapon systems in use 
for military operations.  Given increases in technology do these measures provide enough 
insight into the interactions that they are meant to capture or are new measurements 
needed?  What is an appropriate measure for a space system, which provides 
simultaneous global support to military and civilian users?  What about long-term versus 
short-term effects?  These are difficult questions to answer and highlight the difficulty in 
evaluating space systems.  Surveying space-based information users to find out exactly 
how space is used in completion of their mission aids in the development of appropriate 
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measures of effectiveness.  Another factor to consider is level of fidelity.  Classic MOE, 
such as Pk, are great at measuring high fidelity effects but what is lacking is lower fidelity 
MOE that represents similar measures at an aggregate level.  The development of proper 
MOE’s for the level of fidelity required is a critical modeling and analysis issue. 
Modeling  
The next step in this framework is to demonstrate the worth of the space system 
of interest using a representative model.  As discussed in Chapter II, space is not well 
represented above the system level in modeling and simulation.  A reason for this is the 
difficulty of aggregating the effects of space-based systems.  The global influence 
provided by space systems are currently measured only in local terms as represented in 
system level models.  This high fidelity modeling may not be appropriate for low fidelity 
issues.  A means of aggregating these high fidelity models into lower levels of fidelity is 
needed. 
First, armed with the necessary space system mission details and appropriate 
MOE, an inspection can be performed of the current existing models available for 
analysis.  If a model exists that is suitable as a surrogate for the space system of interest 
and is capable of providing the appropriate level of detail then it should be used.  
However, if a model does not exist, it needs to be built.  The modeling process itself is a 
complex and difficult process and it is beneficial to use well-accepted techniques for 
successful modeling.  The recommended process for using modeling and simulation was 
listed in Chapter II, Figure 4 (see Appendix A).  A model does not need to be extremely 
complex to be valid—simplicity is sometimes preferred (Ravindran, 3).  To capture some 
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of the effects of space, this intermediate step of modeling just the appropriate effects, is 
an option to consider. 
Space, while a complex environment, should only be modeled with the features 
that are relevant.  Unneeded complexity can be eliminated using the responsibility matrix 
to further define the questions and problems to be modeled.  The responsibility matrix 
allows an analyst or decision maker to track the effects of changes in work packages on 
the overall schedule as well as its effect on other work packages.  In this case, the 
responsibility matrix allows space operators to track the effects of changes in the primary 
and ancillary missions of a space system, other systems and the users of the space 
systems.   
A complete up to date inventory of models and how space interacts in them is 
required.  A flexible plug and play simulation environment to measure effects and a 
Verified, Validated, and Accredited model of both space and war that captures multiple 
effects – primary, secondary, tertiary, and allows for short term and long term effects.   
Design of Experiments 
Once the primary and ancillary missions of a space system are understood and a 
full identification of military operations utilizing military or civilian space-based 
information is accomplished, an appropriate Design of Experiments (DOE) needs to be 
defined in order to test the worth of a space system in regards to the issue at hand.  A 
DOE is necessary to properly control and evaluate any experimentation.  The information 
provided by the responsibility matrix allows us to make certain characterizations about 
the system of interest that can then be tested using a design of experiments.  “In most 
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real-life situations the experiment must be done under one or more constraints…Often a 
trade-off must be sought between quality of information obtained and the time (or cost) 
required to obtain it” (Murthy, 195).  As previously mentioned, the level of information 
required to determine the total effectiveness of a system may be unobtainable or require 
too much time to collect to address the question in time for the issue at hand.  The long-
term and short-term effects global space systems provide to military operations may be 
successfully modeled, but only after characterizations can be made and tested by 
appropriate design of experiments.  Questions and hypotheses should be developed about 
the space system of interest and the various missions enabled by space.  The appropriate 
information and design of experiments should attempt to answer the questions about the 
space system.  AFSPC has provided some examples of questions they are interested in 
answering.  
• What synergistic effects do satellites provide to mission accomplishment and 
how are these force multipliers measured?  
 
• [How] Does the loss or degradation of space assets affect putting bombs on 
target? 
 
• How do we measure damage or degradation in satellite?  
 
• At what point does satellite degradation start affecting mission effectiveness?  
 
• At what points in the peace, pre-conflict, conflict, return to peace process is 
space critical?  (Whitsel, 2001) 
 
Once characterizations about a space system can be made and appropriate 
measures have been selected appropriate analysis can be accomplished to determine its 
military effectiveness. 
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As space systems often provide multiple primary and ancillary missions, ideally 
each material mission would be evaluated in regard to the question at hand.  If such a 
review is infeasible, then critical missions must be reviewed.  Each mission may have 
different measures of effectiveness and a different population of users at various levels of 
aggregation.  In order to measure the total effect of a space system, mission studies may 
have to be aggregated.  The main task will be identifying and quantifying key “drivers” 
of military worth and then aggregating this information to an appropriate level of fidelity.   
Simulation and Analysis 
Analysis of the results of the modeled space system should be accomplished using 
the predefined experiment and valid statistical or analytical techniques.  Due to the wide 
range of space systems and mission uses, one technique may be preferable to another; 
therefore any one technique is not recommended in this methodology.  Instead, insistence 
on the importance of valid analysis at the end of the study is required.   
As a pilot example, the effectiveness of the GPS positioning data and its affect on 
munitions accuracy will be modeled using GIANT in Chapter IV.  The error associated 
with GPS positioning, both for an airframe and a particular munitions, will be the subject 
of this pilot study.  Of particular interest, is how degradation of the GPS signal affects the 
positioning error of both the GPS-guided launching airframe and the GPS-guided weapon 
system?  DOE will be used to determine significant interaction of these errors and their 
effect on weapon lethality. 
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The approach proposed in this thesis is applied to a pilot study of a facet of the 
Global Positioning System (GPS) to illustrate the military effectiveness of the GPS.  
While this approach will not capture all primary and secondary effects of GPS, it will 
illustrate how data can be developed and tested for this purpose.  This study will focus on 
how the degradation or denial of a GPS signal affects a GPS-guided weapon.  To carry 
out a complete analysis of GPS, an aggregation of critical missions must be analyzed in a 
similar fashion.   
It should be noted, however, that to completely assess the military worth of GPS, 
this process must be applied to all key aspects of the GPS mission (both short-term and 
long-term), not just the single example provided here.  Resources (time limitations, as 
well as classification restrictions) have precluded such a complete analysis.  The 
illustrative example is provided not to completely evaluate the worth of GPS, but rather 
to illustrate the concept. 
Mission Breakdown Structure 
The GPS mission, as represented in AFSPC’s GPS Concept of Operations (GPS 
CONOPS) document, is to provide precise, all-weather, three-dimensional position, 
velocity, and time (PVT) information to military and civil users in air, land, sea, or space 
environments during peacetime and wartime operations.  GPS uses in times of war 
include: enroute navigation, low-level navigation, target acquisition, close air support, 
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missile guidance, command and control, all-weather air drop, sensor emplacement, 
precision survey, precision timing, instrument approach, rendezvous, coordinate 
bombing, UAV/UCAV operations, search and rescue, intelligence gathering, and time 
transfer.  Additional wartime uses of GPS would include the same civil uses that are 
carried out in times of peace.  GPS fulfills a mission support or force enhancement role.  
These roles are depicted in Figure 14.  This chart, listing the mission functions provided 
by GPS, was created from unclassified and open-source literature. 
 


















































Source:  Open-source literature 
Figure 14.  GPS Supported User Segment Mission Breakdown Structure 
 
Figure 15 depicts the mission of each segment in the GPS.  The space segment 
provides the navigation and timing information used by military, civilian, and 
commercial sectors.  The ground segment provides command and control, prediction, and 
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maintenance of the satellite and navigation message.  The user segment only receives and 
processes data for mission use.  For example, an F-15E GPS and Inertial Navigation 
System (INS) guidance system or JDAM guidance package would fall under the user 
segment.  This chart was created from unclassified open-source literature.  The secondary 
GPS bus payload, the NUDET Detection System is not modeled within this research.  As 
a separate system, NDS must be similarly studied, but its interaction would be key in 
capturing the total worth.  In addition, in a larger study, all the other key military and 






































Source:  Open-source literature 




The responsibility matrix aids in understanding of the various interactions of the 
GPS missions and the responsible organizations. Ideally, such matrices would be created 
electronically and be maintained by the relevant organizations.  Web-based, interoperable 
model architecture will be required to organize such a database.  Multi-level 
classifications will also be needed if military and civilian users have access to this 
database. To create the responsibility matrix, the mission breakdown structures are cross-
referenced with the GPS organizational command structure found in AFSPC’s GPS 
Concept of Operations document.  A limited responsibility matrix is displayed in Figure 
16.  This chart gives a simple example for various types of platform.  For example, the F-
15E airframe uses GPS Positioning and Velocity (Navigation) information for Navigation 
as well as Timing data for information and data transfer to the on board weapons systems.   
As mentioned in the previous chapters the responsibility matrix allows for the 
tracking of effects on the mission caused by changes in the availability of the GPS 
navigation and time message.  Changes in timing or navigation information would have 
limited effect on a civilian luxury sedan with onboard GPS navigation.  The driver would 
still be able to navigate provided they know the route or had a map.  However, changes in 
the positioning and timing information could have a serious effect on the Navy’s high-
tech AEGIS Class Destroyers.  Changes in positioning data can also affect air platforms 
and weapons delivery.  The F-15E can deliver gravity bombs, which do not require GPS 
information, however, changes in GPS information can affect the position of the F-15E at 
weapons release, which indirectly transfers the position error to the gravity bomb. 
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GPS User Segment
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Source:  Open-source literature 
Figure 16.  Limited GPS Responsibility Matrix 
 
Measures of Effectiveness 
The literature review provided the relevant unclassified information to illustrate 
the mission breakdown structure (MBS) and responsibility matrix for the use of GPS-
provided navigation information in an operational short-term wartime environment.  This 
mission organization process was then used to aid in the determination of the military 
worth of GPS in an operational mission setting using the appropriate measures of 
effectiveness (MOE).  The MOEs chosen for this pilot analysis were the circular error 
probable (CEP), horizontal 1-sigma error, and Pk.  CEP is the radius of a circle centered 
at the true target location of which a certain percentage (i) of measured impacts fall.  CEP 
is used for horizontal accuracy using the following formula at various levels of 
confidence is: 
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)1ln(2 iCEPi −−=σ  
where i is the level of confidence desired and σ is the horizontal 1-sigma error 
(GIANT, Veridian).  These are classic measures that are commonly accepted by the 
operator community and used in the Joint Munition Effectiveness Manuals (JMEMs) to 
assess weapon effectiveness.   
GIANT Scenario 
As an illustrative example of one aspect of the type of analysis that must be 
undertaken, the operational wartime mission of GPS is modeled in GIANT.  To 
determine the effects GPS has on an operational mission, GIANT was used to model the 
flight route of a Joint Directed Attack Munitions (JDAM) weapon and the F-15E 
airframe.  Due to its extensive usage during the prosecution of the war on terrorists in 
Afghanistan and its subsequent procurement increases, Joint Directed Attack Munitions 
(JDAM) was selected as the specific weapon to be modeled.  To model JDAM accuracy, 
an adequate launch platform is required.  The F-15E was chosen for a launch platform 
because it was readily available within the model selected for analysis.   
There are three major sources of GPS related error for the weapon.  The first 
would be the initial GPS-derived position and velocity error provided by the launching 
platform, in this case the F-15E.  A second source of error derives from the GPS-based 
guidance and control systems on the JDAM itself.  A final source of error derives from 
the geometry of the GPS constellation relative to the user, which varies with time.   
The primary focus of this pilot research is on the overall accuracy of the weapon 
system.  The F-15E platform is only modeled to develop the initial position and velocity 
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error associated with weapons release, which is a result of the F-15E’s GPS/INS drift 
error.  Ideally, an appropriate random process would represent the drift error; however, 
the F-15E guidance system drift error is classified.  While this data could be illustrated 
with a uniform or triangular distribution, it would be more precise to use the actual drift.  
For the purpose of this illustration such classified numbers were unnecessary.  Further, 
the drift error is dependent on whether or not GPS is available.  If GPS were available, 
then the guidance accuracy would be within 6.3 meters or less as listed in HQ AFSPC 
GPS Concept of Operations.  If GPS were not available, then the drift error will grow no 
greater than 0.8 nautical miles per second as specified by Litton’s guidance and control 
system (LN-94 Second Generation F-15 INU) for the F-15E (Litton).   
A final potential source of error is enemy jamming of the GPS signal.  Jamming 
degrades the GPS signal strength, making it more difficult for GPS receivers to acquire 
the GPS signal.  These Jammers come in a variety of sizes and power outputs from a 1-
watt hand-portable jammer to a 1000-watt vehicle-mounted jammer (Veridian).  Due to 
classification issues and the large variety of existing jammers, jammers werel not 
specifically modeled.  As a surrogate, the GPS signal strength itself will be degraded.  
Degradation can occur from space environmental weather, atmospheric conditions and 
signal jamming.  A jammer has the effect of reducing GPS signal strength so directly 
modifying the signal strength will have a similar effect.  If this scenario were expanded 
beyond this limited example, local GPS jammers would need to be modeled.   
Several input factors must be considered before a valid scenario can be simulated.  
Veridian Engineering of Dayton, Ohio supplied the GIANT model and some notional 
input data.  In addition, the Naval Air Warfare Weapons Division (NAWCWPNS), 
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GPS/INS Branch provided ephemeris data for GPS Week 129, 13-19 February 2002.  
This data is used to determine position and velocity of the GPS satellites over the 
specified time period.  Table 6 provides the relevant data chosen as input into the GIANT 
scenario. 
Table 6.  GIANT Scenario Input Data 
Model Input Data Used Remarks File Name 
SV Signal 28 MHz on L1 C/A, 10 % 
increments 
25 MHz on L1 P(Y) 
22 MHz on L2 P(Y) 
 Satellitethesis.SIG 
MEO Constellation 
Week 129 ephemeris data 
Provided by  




UERE Not user created, supplied 
with model Supplied by Veridian  
Terrain North East Asia Terrain Supplied by Veridian NEA.TER 
SSPD JDAM Pk calculations based 
on target CEP  Supplied by Veridian 
Wpn012-
Tgt0001.SSPD 
Munition Circular Error Sigma 
Target Location: 6 Meters 
Weapon Guidance: 2 Meters 
Supplied by Veridian JDAM.MUN 
Body Masking F-15 & JDAM Body Mask 
Files Supplied by Veridian F-15 & JDAM. Body 
GPS Antenna GAS7 ANEFS for F-15 
Generic FRPA for JDAMs Supplied by Veridian 
GAS7.ANEFS 
Installed.FRPA 
GPS Receiver GemIII receiver for F-15 





EGI F-15 INS 
JDAM INS Supplied by Veridian 
EGI.INS 
JDAM.INS 
Platform F-15E Launcher Platform 
JDAM-Mk84 Weapon 
Platform 
Supplied by Veridian F-15E.PTF JDAM.PTF 
Target Laydown Lat: 38.666, Long: 125.8333  Thesis.TGT 




Routes Route #1 is Launcher Route 
Route #2 is Weapon Route  Thesis.ROUTELIST 
Attrition Zero attrition applied, no 
threats modeled 
EADSIM data can be 




1 weapon per attack and 1 
weapon per target  
Thesis.DMPI.GNT 
Hand-off Random Distribution Random Distribution for Initial Position Error Thesis.HANDOFF 
Source: Veridian, GIANT Users Manual, GIANT Analysts Manual 
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Design of Experiments 
The signal strength of the L1 C/A frequency was degraded by 10 percent 
increments to 50 percent.  This was sufficient for simulating various jammers of 
increasing signal strength. Table 7 presents this design of experiments (DOE) 
graphically.  The factors in this pilot study will then be tested for differences in the mean 
at the α = 0.05 level.   
Table 7.  Design of Experiment 
2-Factors 6-Levels 
No Initial degrade 
10% Initial Degrade 
20% Initial Degrade 
30% Initial Degrade 
40% Initial Degrade 
Initial Degradation 
50% Initial Degrade 
No Degrade After Release 
10% Degrade After Release 
20% Degrade After Release 
30% Degrade After Release 
40% Degrade After Release 
Degrade After Weapons Release 
50% Degrade After Release 
 
The formal hypothesis test used during this process uses the “paired observation” 
approach mentioned in Hartman’s High Resolution Combat Modeling.  “Let Zi be output 
MOE from n1 independent replications of scenario 1 and let Yi be the same MOE from 
the n2 independent replications of scenario 2.  If n1 = n2, then the paired observation 
approach can be used” (Hartman, 2-28).  Xi = Zi = Yi for i = 1, 2, …, 30.  For large Xi, 
scenario 1 was better, for small Xi, the scenarios were about the same.  The confidence 
interval for population means, nSntX /)2/1,1( 2α−−±=CI , can be used to gain 
information on the differences in scenarios.  If the CI contains zero then there is no 
significant difference between the two scenarios.  A CI greater than zero it implies 
scenario 1 is better.  A CI of less than zero implies scenario 2 is better.  This approach is 
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used for every confidence interval except when sample sizes are not the same.  Means 
comparison for different sample sizes is used in this case. 
GIANT was used to model the drift error and subsequent initial weapon release 
error.  Using the F-15E as a launching platform, a bombing route was simulated with 30 
replications.  Each replication start time was increased by one hour to account for normal 
fluctuations in daily Dilution of Precision (DOP) error.  DOP is the normal fluctuation in 
GPS position error due to satellite placement in the sky.  If the satellites are too low or 
too high in the horizon, GPS error coverage area increases in size.  This is displayed in 
Figure 17.  For minimum GPS error (lowest DOP) a user needs one satellite directly 
overhead and three spaced about 120-degrees apart near the user’s horizon.  As the GPS 
satellites move in their orbits throughout the day, changes to DOP are expected.   
 
Source:  GPS SPS, 2.1.2-1 
Figure 17.  GPS Dilution of Precision 
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During the simulation, GIANT creates a weapon handoff file that contains the 
horizontal and vertical position, velocity, and time errors associated with a weapons 
release.  The horizontal error measured by GIANT is the difference between the Desired 
Mean Point of Impact (DMPI) and the actual impact point.  This is referred to in GIANT 
as the Horizontal 1-Sigma error.  Table 8 displays the resulting 95% confidence interval 
about the mean horizontal 1-sigma error.   









No Degrade 1.90 0.24 0.09 1.46 2.30 30 
10 % (Low) Degrade 3.13 2.79 1.04 1.63 13.50 30 
20% Degrade (w/o 
Outliers 
243.00 






30% (Med) Degrade 722.00 1090.00 407.00 2.19 2400.00 30 
40% Degrade 2200.00 192.00 72.90 2010.00 2400.00 30 
50% (High) Degrade 2200.00 192.00 72.90 2010.00 2400.00 30 
 
The 10 and 20 percent degradation scenarios were almost identical, with the 
exception of 3 data points for the 20% scenario.  The 10% increase in GPS signal degrade 
was not enough to adversely affect the ability to receive the GPS signal.  These data 
points were determined to be statistical outliers.  If those three data points are deleted and 
a means comparison test for different sample sizes is used there is no statistically 
significant difference between the means of the 10% scenario and the 20% scenario at the 
α = 0.05 level.  This is displayed in Table 9.  Testing was accomplished by creating a 
confidence interval on the difference in the observed results of the two scenarios as 
required when comparing two different simulation situations (Hartman, 2-28).  A 
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comparison of two scenarios that result in a confidence interval that contains zero is 
considered to be not statistical different. 
Table 9.  Means Comparison Test 
Scenario Difference in Means (X2-X1) T(n1+n2-2, α) Lower Bound Upper Bound 
10% vs 20% 239.87 2.011739 239.35 240.39 
10% vs 20% 
(minus outliers) 0.20 2.0141033 -0.334 0.734 
 
In addition, the last two scenarios, 40% and 50%, show no difference in 
degradation.  This is due to simulated thresholds for GPS and INS accuracy within 
GIANT.  When a GPS signal is unavailable, GIANT uses modeled INS drift error to 
calculate position location. This INS drift error is used until a GPS signal is acquired.  If 
GPS is never reacquired then the position error continues to grow based on the INS drift 
error.  Therefore in the 40% and 50% scenario, GPS signal is unavailable to the GPS 
receiver onboard the F-15E and INS drift error is used to obtain position information.   
As a result of the analysis of the initial handoff error, the original design factors of 
degrading GPS in 10% decrements was reduced from six to four factors: no, low (10%), 
medium (30%), and high (50%) degradation. This is represented in Table 10 as before 
each factor will be tested to determine if there is any difference in the means at the α = 
0.05 level.  The resulting horizontal handoff error is displayed in Figure 18.  This handoff 
error is used as the initial weapon system error upon release from the launch platform 
Table 10.  Reduced Design of Experiment 
2-Factors 6-Levels 
No Initial degrade 
Low (10%) Initial Degrade 
Med (30%) Initial Degrade Initial Degrade 
High (50%) Initial Degrade 
No Degrade After Release 
Low (10%) Degrade After Release 
Med (30%) Degrade After Release Degrade After Weapons Release 
High (50%) Degrade After Release 
58 














































































































































































Figure 18.  Limited Horizontal Hand-off Error 
 
Figure 18 contains a series of 4 lines graphed.  These lines are based on the 
horizontal handoff error points for each modeled scenario and are connected to depict the 
variation in error….  The bottom-most line, No Initial Degrade, represents the horizontal 
accuracy error of the F-15E when no degradation in GPS signal is present.  This position 
error is transferred to the munition upon weapon release.  For the No and Low Initial 
Degrade scenarios, horizontal error is minimally affected and in fact are not statistically 
different at the α = 0.05 level.  However, in the Medium Initial Degrade scenario, 
fluctuations in position accuracy can be seen.  This is due to the Dilution of Precision 
(DOP) mentioned earlier.  These normal fluctuations are exaggerated when the satellite 
signal strength is degraded.  This implies that Medium Initial Degrade provides 
additional error to the expected normal position errors. 
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Figure 19 displays the initial error in terms of CEP at the 50% level and Figure 20 
displays the CEP at the 95% level.  This indicates that 50% and 95% of the outcomes, 
respectively, will fall within the indicated radius.  As would be expected, the CEP at the 
50% level is more closely grouped than at the 95% level.  If no degrade was experienced 
during the F-15E’s flight, its true location would be expected to fall inside the central 
region of both graphs 50% and 95% of the time respectively.  Minor fluctuations are seen 
with low degradation and larger fluctuations are seen with medium degradation.  At high 
GPS degradation the CEP radius expands out to an approximately 2400 unit of distance 
radius.  However, even at the 95% level, the CEP is still within 10 meters for the No 














































Figure 20.  95% CEP at Hand-off 
 
Figure 19 and 20 indicate that when low or medium degradation of GPS is likely, 
time of day is a major factor in hand-off accuracy as seen in the fluctuations on the graph 
in this pilot study.  Due to DOP and reduced GPS signal strength, some variance in 
weapon accuracy is expected.  Under high degradation, time of day or satellite position 
has less impact on weapon accuracy, as the GPS signal is effectively unavailable.  Of 
course, directional consideration and jammer placement will need to be considered in an 
actual test case of jammer effects. 
Weapon modeling runs were accomplished using the handoff errors described 
above for initial error upon free-fall of the weapon.  The released JDAM was modeled in 










































then used to measure the error in weapon accuracy.  This was accomplished by 
subtracting the initial handoff error.  Table 11 provides initial analysis on the horizontal 
1-sigma and 95% CEP weapon error.  As GPS is degraded, accuracy decreases as initially 
expected.  However, degradation after weapon release has a greater impact on weapon 
accuracy in this pilot study.  Figure 21 displays this horizontal 1-sigma weapon error 
increase graphically.  This is the difference in the true target location or desired mean 
point of impact (DMPI) and the actual point of impact. 
Table 11.  Weapon Position Error Scenario Results 
GPS Degrade After Weapons Release 








No Degrade 6.43 15.74 5.71 13.98 646.00 1581.24 2317.39 5672.38 
Low Degrade 7.29 17.84 6.06 14.83 646.00 1581.24 2318.62 5675.4 
Medium Degrade 690.00 1688.95 667.00 1632.65 667.00 1632.65 2320.52 5680.05 
High Degrade 2160.00 5287.13 2160.00 5287.13 2160.00 5287.13 2226.27 5449.35 
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Figure 21.  Horizontal 1-Sigma Weapon Error 
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As displayed in Figure 21, it appears that No and Low Degrade scenarios do not 
adversely affect weapon accuracy.  However, upon medium degradation of the GPS 
signal after weapon release, the No and Low Degrade scenario’s accuracy decreases 
significantly.  It should be noted that improved GPS signal after weapon release cannot 
compensate for the initial error as indicated by the Medium and High Degrade scenarios.  
While the JDAM does have control surfaces, these are small and unable to compensate 
for a great deal of error.  The length and time of weapon descent also plays a factor.   
To test the hypotheses on Figure 21, the differences in scenarios were compared 
and confidence intervals created at the α = 0.05 level (Hartman, 2-28).  Table 12 provides 
data for each scenario to include: mean, standard deviation, and half-width, at the 95% 
level of confidence.   
Table 12.  Scenario Confidence Intervals 
X1 X2 Mean Std Dev Half-Width Min Max # of Obs 
No No 6.43 0.41 0.15 4.45 6.83 30 
Low No 7.29 2.37 0.89 4.45 15.20 30 
Med No 690.00 1080.00 413.00 6.68 2410.00 30 
High No 2160.00 441.00 162.00 6.68 2410.00 30 
No Low 5.71 1.57 0.59 1.06 6.68 30 
Low Low 6.06 1.61 0.60 1.06 10.70 30 
Med Low 667.00 1070.00 401.00 6.68 2410.00 30 
High Low 2160.00 446.00 167.00 6.68 2410.00 30 
No Med 646.00 1060.00 389.00 6.68 2410.00 30 
Low Med 646.00 1060.00 389.00 6.68 2410.00 30 
Med Med 667.00 1070.00 401.00 6.74 2410.00 30 
High Med 2160.00 446.00 167.00 6.74 2410.00 30 
No High 2320.00 450.00 171.00 6.68 2410.00 30 
Low High 2320.00 450.00 171.00 6.68 2410.00 30 
Med High 2320.00 443.00 165.00 6.74 2410.00 30 
High High 2230.00 187.00 69.70 2030.00 2410.00 30 
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Table 13 provides a summary of the means comparison tests on the significance 
of the difference of each modeled scenario.  Reading this table, one can see that there is 
no statistical significance between No and Low Degrade scenarios at the α = 0.05 level.  
However, there is a statistically significant difference between the No/Low Degrade 
scenario and each of the Medium and High Degrade scenarios at the α = 0.05 level.   
 
Table 13.  Scenario Statistical Significance 
No Low Med High
No
Low
Med No Significant Difference
High No Significant Difference
Significance of Degrade Scenarios (α = 0.05)
No Significant Difference
 
The other measure of interest is the probability of kill or Pk.  Table 14 displays the 
expected Pk for each scenario while Figure 22 displays this graphically for each run.  
Again the chart depicts Initial Degrade against Degrade After Weapon Release.  Within 
GIANT, a P(k) below 80 % requires additional weapons on target to reach a level of 
confidence on target destruction.   
Table 14.  Modeled Weapon System Pk 
Initial GPS Degrade No Degrade Low Degrade Medium Degrade High Degrade
No Degrade 0.80 0.80 0.51 0.04 
Low Degrade 0.78 0.78 0.51 0.04 
Medium Degrade 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.04 
High Degrade 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 
 
As indicated in Table 14 and displayed in Figure 22, GPS availability has a major 
impact on weapon lethality.  As the degradation after weapons release increases, Pk 
decreases.  No Initial Degrade Pk is around 80% with little or no fluctuation until 
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degraded to the medium level.  Upon high degradation, all scenarios’ Pk drops to 




























Figure 22.  Weapon Pk 
 
While it has been shown that GPS availability, or the lack thereof, can affect 
weapon performance (e.g., accuracy and lethality), a more detailed analysis must be 
performed to understand how initial degradation and GPS availability after weapon 
release affect weapon accuracy.  With the available data, response surface methodology 
(RSM) can be employed to help understand the interactions of Initial Degrade and 
Degrade after Weapon Release on horizontal 1-sigma weapon error.  Initial experiments 
with fitting the results to a predictable model indicated no interaction between the No 
Degrade scenario and the Low Degrade scenario as was witnessed in the figures and 
tables above.  Therefore, the No Degrade scenario was removed.  The resulting scenarios 
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offer a two-factor, three-level design of experiments (DOE).  Table 15 displays the 
design factors and levels for the DOE.  “RSM is useful for analyzing problems in which 
several independent variables influence a dependent variable” (Montgomery, 445).   Of 
course, the goal of RSM is to optimize the response.  For this research effort, RSM is 
used to explain the modeled results and their interaction and demonstrate another possible 
analysis. 
Table 15.  Design of Experiments 
Factors Levels 
Initial Degrade 
-1 Low Degrade 
 0 Medium Degrade
 1 High Degrade 
Degrade After Weapons Release 
-1 Low Degrade 
 0 Medium Degrade
 1 High Degrade 
 
Due to nonlinear interactions discovered in the initial experiment, a second-order 
model was fitted using SAS JMPin 4.0.2 (Academic) statistical software.  Figure 23 
summarizes the results of the JMPin analysis.  By analyzing these outputs, an 
understanding can be gained regarding the interactions of our two factors and weapon 
accuracy.  The first significant result is gleaned from the R-square value.  This value 
represents the overall appropriateness of the model at explaining the variability in the 
data.  At 0.73, this fitted model explains a large percentage of the variability at least in 
the pilot study.  While there appears to be an extremely high mean square error (MSE) 
this is due, in part, to the scale of the data.  Because our unit of distance range as shown 
in Table 12 goes from 6.68 to 2410.00, our MSE was rather large.  To confirm this 
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scaling issue, multiplying the data by 0.001 dropped the MSE from 2822755 to 2.82275 
with no change to R-square or F-values. 
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
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Figure 23.  RSM Results Obtained from JMPin 
 
Reviewing the p-values provided in Figure 23, we see that the two main effects 
(Initial Degrade and Degrade After Weapons Release) significantly change (p-value < 
0.05) the horizontal 1-sigma weapon error.  In addition, the interaction effects also 
significantly change the horizontal 1-sigma weapon error.   
The validity of the model at predicting the interaction of Initial Degrade and 
Degrade After Weapons Release would not be comprehensive if the residuals were not 
normally distributed.  The residuals are the difference between the observed value and the 
predicted value (Neter, 25).  It is important to plot the residuals and check for normality 
to validate the fitted model because normality was an assumption required by this 
technique.  The results of this normality confirmation are listed in Figure 24.  While the 
67 
residuals are not exactly normally distributed, the moderate departures from normality do 
not imply a lack of model validity (Montgomery, 86).  In Figure 24, there is slight 
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Figure 24.  Residual Distribution Plot 
 
After the model validation process, the model can be used for predictions.  The 
fitted model is a quadratic relation.  “It is unlikely that a polynomial model will be a 
reasonable approximation of the true functional relationship over the entire space of the 
independent variables, but in a relatively small region they usually work quite well” 
(Montgomery, 446).  As proven earlier, the model is a good fit over our limited data set.  
This may not be true for an expanded example; however, similar analysis might yield an 
improved model.  The model parameter estimates are displayed in Table 16 and the 
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Horizontal 1- Sigma Weapon Error
Figure 25.  Response Surface for Horizontal 1-Sigma Weapons Error 
 
For this modeled scenario, this equation can be used to determine the predicted 
horizontal weapon error given a particular degrade scenario.  For example, if during 
mission planning it is discovered that medium GPS degradation can be expected in 
theater and low GPS degradation is anticipated at or near the target, the level effects 
provided in Table 15 can be used to predict weapon accuracy.   
X1 = Medium = 0, X2 = Low = -1, Y = 42.2 units of distance error 
69 









PS signal, the signal is jammed for all 
receive
n 
 other elements such as error caused by wind or direction and placement of GPS 
signal jammers.  The approach, however, could be applied to a much larger example.  
Ideally, if this were done for every key drift effecter, a predictive measurement could b
developed that could then apply space-based effects of GPS to JMEM. 
It is clear fr
y of a JDAM weapon.  Minor GPS signal degradation should not significantly 
decrease accuracy if it occurs prior to weapon release or during weapon freefall due to 
small initial error and freefall geometry.  Minor GPS signal degradation would be create
by small handheld or vehicle-mounted jammers with a small signal strength output (1-10 
watts).  With larger jammers, weapon accuracy will be affected adversely whether it 
occurs during weapon freefall or before weapon release.  If GPS degradation affects 
weapon handoff, unguided weapons will be off course before or upon release.  As the
gravity bombs have little to no guidance or error correction capability, the error will only
grow as it falls based on its speed and trajectory. 
If an adversary or ally chooses to jam the G
rs within range of the jammer, affecting both adversary and allied receivers.  This 
is an important concept to understand when determining whether GPS degradation may 
occur in the area of operations.  A less technologically advanced country like Afghanista
does not use GPS for military operations and might be expected to use GPS jamming to 
deny its use to its adversaries.  In contrast, the intentional degradation of GPS by a more 
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technologically advanced country may be less likely as they may use GPS for military 
and civil operations.  There are other less superior methods used for navigation and 
positioning.  Both Russia and China have positioning systems, however, at the open-
source level of information it is unclear whether Russia’s system is inferior or technic
equal to our GPS system.  It may be possible to jam our signal while maintaining the use 
of their system.  To more completely model GPS in this environment, directional 
jammers should be incorporated along with different types of guided and unguided
munitions against both stationary and moving targets.  Also the number of replicatio
should be increased to not only simulate longer operations windows but to develop 
tighter levels of confidence in output analysis. 








l use of 
 
d by the number of sorties required to ensure target destruction.  Increasing 
degrade on the GPS signal would have the effect of increasing the number of aircraf
sorties flown against a particular target as the probability of kill decreased as jamming
increased.  However, this measure may not directly translate into a total military 
effectiveness for GPS.  After this process has been accomplished for every critica
GPS, a method of aggregation will be required to determine the total effectiveness of 
GPS.   
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This chapter reviews the importance of this research as well as the major issues 
covered during this research.  The major findings of the literature are also summarized.  
This is followed by a review of the results of efforts to assess the issues in modeling the 
effectiveness of space.  The chapter concludes with recommendations for future research 
relating to this topic. 
Literature Review Findings 
Joint space doctrine does not officially exist.  As a result, clear official direction 
to operators is unavailable.  As military doctrine is the foundation of determining military 
effectiveness or worth, it is difficult to assess space’s worth and therefore to evaluate 
modeling space.  In the absence of joint doctrine, AFSPC has developed space doctrine to 
provide Air Force operational direction and establish responsibilities.  With the recent 
selection of General Lance Lord as AFSPC/CC, the Space Commission’s opinion that 
AFSPC become the DOD executive agent for space appear to have been approved.  With 
other recent developments, such as the President’s decision to withdraw the U.S. from the 
1972 ABM Treaty, space may be transitioning from a support function to an operational 
function similar to airpower’s transformation after World War I.   
Specific models with required levels of fidelity for comprehensive space 
modeling is not complete.  Available models contain large gaps in representation.  Figure 
6 in Chapter II provided a visual representation of the issue of level of fidelity in space 
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modeling.  Current mission and system level models, those at a high level of fidelity, do a 
good job at representing the aspects of space.  The theater and campaign level models, 
those at a low level of fidelity, do a poor job of representing the aspects of space.  What 
is required is a method of aggregating the representation of space aspects in high fidelity 
models into intermediate and lower level fidelity models.   
Relevance of the Research 
The DOD is relying on space for operational mission support at an ever-
increasing rate.  If this reliance on space is not understood, the U.S. and its national 
security become more vulnerable to operational degradation and mission failure as the 
result of space information degradation or denial.  This thesis attempts to identify a 
framework in organizing the interactions and responsibilities among space systems, 
system owner/operators, and space-based information users.  These are all necessary 
steps in accurately modeling space. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Space is clearly not well represented in the various theater level models as 
outlined in Chapter II.  However, as Chapter IV illustrates, space is better represented in 
some system-level or high fidelity models and simulations.  What is missing is a way of 
aggregating that high fidelity information into the theater level models.  In addition, is the 
theater or campaign level models valid for measuring the military worth of space or does 
a Global level model need to be created?  Missing is appropriate measures for 
determining spaces’ global military worth.  What is the ultimate measure of a battle or a 
campaign?  Is winning a Pyric victory winning?  Is a military “win” that results in a 
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political loss a victory?  What is the measure of a conflict deterred because of 
information superiority?   
As was seen in the illustrative example, the classical measures used to relate space 
worth to the warfighter, may not directly measure the military worth of space.  A clear 
understanding of the space missions and those impacted by space is required before any 
further research can be accomplished in measuring the military worth of space.  Future 
studies should use the proposed process in this thesis to gain insight into the other critical 
missions supported by space-based systems.  This is required, regardless of the level of 
fidelity.  A method of aggregating this system level model detail into theater or campaign 
level models is a complex but necessary task.   
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APPENDIX A.  SIMULATION STUDY DETAILS (LAW, 84-86) 
 
. 
1.  Formulate the problem and plan the study. 
 
a. Problem of interest is stated by manager. 
   
b. One or more kickoff meetings for the study are conducted, with the project 
manager, the simulation analysts, and the subject-matter experts (SMEs) 
in attendance.  The following issues are discussed: 
 
• Overall objectives of the study 
 
• Specific questions to be answered by the study 
 
• Performance measures that will be used to evaluate the efficacy of 
different system configurations 
 
• Scope of the model 
 
• System configurations to be modeled 
 
• Software to be used 
 
• Time frame for the study and the required resources 
 
2. Collect data and define model.  
 
a. Collect information on the system layout and operation procedures.  
 
• No single person or document is sufficient 
 
• Some people may have inaccurate information—make sure that true 
SMEs are identified 
 
• Operating procedures may not be formalized 
 
b. Collect data (if possible) to specify model parameters and input 
probability distributions.  
 
c. Delineate the above information and date in an “assumptions document,” 
which is the conceptual model.  
 
d. Collect data (if possible) on the performance of the existing system (for 
validation purposes in step 6).  
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e. The level of model detail should depend on the following:  
 
• Project objectives 
 
• Performance measures 
 
• Data availability 
 
• Credibility concerns 
 
• Computer constraints 
 
• Opinions of SMEs 
 
• Time and money constraints 
 
f. There need not be a one-to-one correspondence between each element of 
the model and the corresponding element of the system.  
 
g. Interact with the manager (and other key project personnel) on a regular 
basis.  
 
3. Is the conceptual model valid?  
 
a. Perform a structured walk-through of the conceptual model using the 
assumptions document before an audience of managers, analysts, and 
SMEs.  
 
• Helps ensure that the model’s assumptions are correct and complete 
 
• Promotes ownership of the model 
 
• Takes place before programming begins to avoid significant 
reprogramming later. 
 
4. Construct a computer program and verify.  
 
a. Program the model in a programming language or in simulation software.  
Benefits of using a programming language are that once one is often 
known, they have a low purchase cost, and they may result in a smaller 
model executions time.  The use of simulation software, on the other hand, 
reduces programming time and results in a lower project cost.  
 
b. Verify (debug) the simulation computer program.  
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5. Make pilot runs.  
 
a. Make pilot runs for validation purposes in Step 6.  
 
6. Is the programmed model valid?  
 
a. If there is an existing system, then compare model and system 
performance measures for the existing system.  
 
b. Regardless of whether there is an existing system, the simulation analysts 
and SMEs should review the model for correctness.  
 
c. Use sensitivity analysis to determine what model factors have significant 
impact on performance measures and, thus, have to be modeled carefully. 
 
7. Design experiments.  
 
a. Specify the following for each system configuration of interest: 
 
• Length of each run 
 
• Length of the warmup period, if one is appropriate 
 
• Number of independent simulation runs using different random 
numbers—facilitates construction of confidence intervals 
 
8. Make production runs.  
 
a. Production runs are made for use in Step 9. 
 
9. Analyze output data.  
 
a. Two major objectives in analyzing output data are: 
 
• Determining the absolute performance of certain system configurations 
 
• Comparing alternative system configurations in a relative sense 
 
10.  Document, present, and use results.  
 
a. Document assumptions, computer program, and study’s result for use in 
the current and future projects. 
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b. Present study’s results. 
 
• Use animation to communicate model to managers and other people 
who are not familiar with all of the model details. 
 
• Discuss model building and validation process to promote credibility. 
 









The following information was provided by MAJ Bill McLagan of USSPACECOM/AN 
and is dated 1 August 2001. 
 
Advanced Real-Time Gaming Universal Simulation (ARGUS):  ARGUS models the 
offensive and defensive ballistic missile environment from strategic to tactical ballistic 
missile attack.  It is used to analyze C2 structures for the future national missile defense 
system.  Will be replaced by WARGAME 2000. 
POC JNTF, Maj Joe Moles, 719-567-9931 
 
Advanced Regional Exploratory System (ARES):  ARES is being developed as the 
Army’s new theater campaign analysis model.  ARES is an event-driven, deterministic, 
variable resolution, object-oriented simulation that will support analysis of 
joint/combined land, air and maritime force operations, including force sufficiency and 
OPLAN testing in a wide range of potential threat and operational conditions, such as 
multi-sided, and/or, nonlinear-combat environments.  ARES supports information 
operations analyses by emphasizing information flow from sensors over communications 
paths to command and control nodes.  ARES supports the use of ground truth or 
perception modes of operation.  While ground truth mode uses perfect knowledge of the 
battlespace, perception mode limits each decision-maker to only that information his/her 
unit’s organic sensors have collected and any information reported by subordinate and 
superior units and then fuses that information into a battlespace view unique to that 
particular command node.  ARES uses “effectors” to support sensitivity analyses on the 
effects of destruction, disruption, or exploitation of command, control, communications 
and intelligence nodes and associated assets.  ARES will offer three mechanisms for 
modeling command & control:  a) the use of rulebases for automated command & 
control, currently representing a reactive control process;  b) scripted OPLAN/OPORD 
scenarios or  c) a combination of rulebase and scripted C2. 
POC USALIWA, Mr. Berlin Lewis, bklewi2@vulcan.belvoir.army.mil, 703-681-6359 or USACAA, Mr. Wally 
Chandler, chandler@caa.army.mil, 301-295-1692 
 
Adversary:  Adversary is a communications network-modeling tool used to analyze 
communication infrastructures and then convey the results of analyses in graphic format.  
It uses an editable baseline and point-and-click analytic processes displayed on an 
OILSTOCK map.  Adversary provides a usable set of tools for both effective support to 
military planning/targeting assessment and SIGINT target development and cataloging. 
POC NSA, Adversary PMO, 301-688-6570 
 
Arena:  This application acts as an arena within which information operations models, 
simulations and data are integrated.  Arena presents an integrated view of various 
command and control aspects including electronic warfare, communications structure and 
performance, targeting, command and control structure and national infrastructure. 
POC JIOC, Mr. Larry Whatley, larry.whatley@jioc.osis.gov, 202-977-4758 
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Battle Area Regions Threatened (BART):  BART is a PC-based, graphical strategic 
ballistic missile defense analysis model designed to estimate the number of ground-based 
interceptor shoot-look-shoot opportunities and other engagement characteristics. 
POC NORAD, Dr. Murray Dixson, murray.dixson@peterson.af.mil, 719-554-3781 
 
Builder:  The Interactive Scenario Builder models the electromagnetic environment and 
allows the user to create deterministic scenarios as a mission-planning tool.  Radar beams 
and coverage using various propagation models are displayed on a DTED map and the 
effects of terrain masking visualized.  The effects of radar jamming also can be displayed.  
With the Aurora feature, communications links and networks can be visualized.  An RF 
coverage visualization tool shows the energy being radiated by a transmitter.  
Communications receiver coverage allows the user to analyze what would happen if you 
tried to jam a communications link.  
POC NRL, (Radars) Dr. Larry Schuette, schuette@nrl.navy.mil, (202) 767-6814 
POC NIWA, (Communications) Rosemary Wenchel, wenchell@niwa.navy.mil, (202) 767-1493 
 
C2W Analysis and Targeting Tool (CATT):  CATT provides a simulation capability of 
an adversary's Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) and the capability for analysts to 
do sensitivity analysis on alternative actions.  It includes end-to-end modeling of IADS 
processes such as detection, tracking, weapons allocation, communication, decision-
making and engagement.  The model's primary C2W actions include inserting and 
removing various user defined flight paths and removing various communications links 
and radar posts. 
POC AFIWC/SAA, LtCol Ross Ziegenhorn, raziege@afiwc.osis.gov, 210-977-2427  
 
C4ISR Model:  The C4ISR Model is a federation of five interacting simulations used to 
integrate C4ISR and combat operations in analysis of joint force campaigns.  The five 
models are combat, command and control, sensor, communications assessment and 
information. 
POC DISA/D83, Carroll Mitchell, 703-696-9181 
 
C4ISR, Space and Missile Operations Simulation (COSMOS):  COSMOS has been 
developed to support analysis of the performance of C4ISR, space and missile systems.  
COSMOS explicitly models collection systems for SIGINT, IMINT and HUMINT as 
well as surveillance systems using visible, IR, LADAR and RADAR technologies.  The 
resources and associated timelines required to process, exploit and disseminate the 
collected information are modeled using a flexible rule-based approach.  COSMOS can 
also model systems in all Space Command mission areas including futuristic US and 
foreign space control systems such as Space-Based Lasers (SBL), Ground-Based Lasers 
(GBL) and Kinetic Energy ASATs (KEASAT).   The model is currently in use 
supporting OSD, Joint Staff, Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine, Office of the Space 
Architect and classified customer analyses.  COSMOS has been interfaced with 
community accepted classified models to support analysis of current and future system 
architecture performance.  Versions of the toolset are available on SUN, Silicon Graphics 
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and TAC-3 workstations.  COSMOS was developed and continues to be enhanced by the 
SAIC Pentagon On Site Team (POST). 
POC Jeff Knox, SAIC 703 276-2116 JEFFREY.S.KNOX@saic.com 
 
Communications Jamming Model (COMJAM):  COMJAM is part of AFIWC's 
Improved Many on Many (IMOM) family of programs to model electronic combat 
scenarios.  COMJAM's main purpose is to predict jamming effectiveness against the 
communications capabilities of both ground-based and airborne communications assets.  
The primary nodes of analysis are network, link and transmission rings analysis. 
POC AFIWC/SAV, Capt Keith Harrington, kjharri@afiwc.osis.gov, 210-977-2706 
 
Communications Modeling Tool (CNMTE):  CNMTE is a tool designed to construct, 
model and analyze traffic for telecommunications networks.  It provides a means to 
combine the network subscriber to the physical network and simulate traffic between 
subscribers.  Simulation results present a picture of the network over time and answer 
such questions as how many calls were sent and received?  What is the probability of 
calls being blocked?  What is message delay?  And what percent of bandwidth is used?  
CNMTE is applicable to network analysis for offense or defense. 
POC JIOC, Mr. Lawrence Whatley, larry.whatley@jioc.osis.gov, 210-977-4758 
 
EDGE Developer Option:  EDGE Developer Option is a commercial off-the-shelf set of 
visualization, simulation and analysis tools and applications that allow you to create a 
rich synthetic environment and view the world from outer space to sea level.  The 
foundation is the EDO Visualization Component.  Additional components provide 
libraries for integrating imagery, maps, terrain, time and weather.  The Ascent tool for 
launch vehicle trajectory simulation component can also run as a stand-alone 
program.http://www.autometric.com 
 
Extended Air Defense System (EADSIM):  EADSIM is a system-level simulation used 
by combat developers, materiel developers and operational commanders to assess the 
effectiveness of theater missile defense (TMD) and air defense systems against the full 
spectrum of extended air defense threats.  EADSIM models fixed- and rotary-wing 
aircraft, tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, infrared and radar sensors, satellites, 
command and control structures, sensor and communications jammers, communications 
networks and devices, and fire support in a dynamic environment which includes the 
effects of terrain and attrition on the outcome of the battle.  The tool provides analysts 
and training audiences insights into TMD architecture, battle management, system 
employment for maximum effectiveness, force structure analysis and mission planning. 
POC Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Mr. Jim Watkins, jim.watkins@smdc.army.mil, 256-955-
1681 
 
Extended Air Defense Testbed (EADTB):  EADTB allows the analyst to model a broad 
range of military missile defense applications from the fire unit level to the theater level 
in a constructive simulation framework.  Its object-based simulation architecture supports 
this range by allowing the user to develop system models called specific system 
representations, or SSRs.  The user/analyst can place numbers of these tailored simulated 
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systems on a host game board without having to rewrite other existing systems models or 
modify the supporting architecture.  A major strength of EADTB is the capability to 
model the BMC4I to the level necessary to answer complicated joint service 
interoperability issues.  EADTB has obtained DIS compatibility and is pursuing HLA 
compliance at this time.  BMDO has certified EADTB as Y2K compliant. 
POC Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Mr. Moody Parsons, parsonsg@smdc.army.mil 
 
Global Positioning System End-to-End Model (GLEEM):  GLEEM was developed to 
assist in analysis of capabilities and vulnerabilities of Global Positioning Systems/Inertial 
Navigation Systems (GPS/INS) in aircraft and guided munitions.  GLEEM allows 
projection of GPS receiver performance in signal lock maintenance while in a hostile or 
benign environment and simulates various combinations of antennas and receivers, on 
multiple platforms, with multiple jammers.  Friendly interference platforms can be 
included as well. 
POC AFIWC/SAV, Lt Michael Perry, mjperry@afiwc.osis.gov, 210-977-2706 
 
GPS Interference and Navigation Tool (GIANT): GPS Interference And Navigation 
Tool (GIANT): GIANT is a constructive and repeatable engagement/mission level 
simulation that calculates the impact of navigation performance on warfighter measures 
of effectiveness (e.g., Target Kills). A GIANT scenario consists of a GPS/INS-equipped 
platform moving over digital terrain (i.e., DTED) on a WGS-84 earth under a moving 
GPS constellation transmitting multiple codes on multiple frequencies. GIANT can 
represent any air or ground vehicle with or without weapons. Weapons also have 
GPS/INS navigation systems and the launch platform to weapon handoff event is 
modeled. As an option, any number of stationary or moving GPS jammers can be present. 
Target miss distance and probability of kill is thus traceable to the weapon and the 
launcher. Many measures of performance and time histories are calculated and output. 
GIANT has been used to support numerous Navwar and EW studies, is validated, 
accredited, and included in the AFSAT. 
POC SMC/CZE, Capt Trent Causey, joseph.causey@losangeles.af.mil, 310-363-
2937 
 
Guardian:  Guardian provides visualization and analysis of space system and 
architecture susceptibility to counterspace threats.  Guardian supports modeling of radio-
frequency (RF) jamming, air-, ground-, and space-based laser phenomenologies, high 
power microwave threats, and direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) systems.  Guardian has 
the capability to model the interruption of system commanding, target imaging, and data 
download to ground stations.  Guardian has been used to explore the effects of jamming 
uplink communications of commercial satellite architectures.   
POC: USAF/SMC/XR 
 
Information Operations Navigator (ION):  ION provides its users a standardized, 
structured methodology for generating the IO portions of an OPLAN in Joint Operational 
Planning and Execution System (JOPES) format and for identifying IO targets for a 
Candidate Master Target List.  ION is based on strategies-to-task methodology to derive 
IO objectives from overall CINC objectives.  The user identifies the effects IO must 
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induce on an adversary in order to accomplish the IO objectives, and this information is 
used to write the corresponding IO tasks.   
POC JIOC, Ms. Regina Walker, regina.walker@jioc.osis.gov, 210-977-2911 
 
Integrated Modeling and Analysis Suite (IMAS):  IMAS models missile launches to 
determine origin and threat.  It is used to develop inputs for Integrated Theater Warning 
and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) end-to-end system integrity tests. 
POC NORAD/USSPACECOM/J6C, Mr. Ron Stephens, ronald.stephens@peterson.af.mil, 719-554-9704 
 
Joint Simulation System (JSIMS):  JSIMS is the next generation simulation for joint 
training and exercises, replacing the Aggregate Level Simulation Protocol (ALSP) Joint 
Training Confederation (JTC).  JSIMS provides the object-oriented environment and 
common services, such as databases, security protocols, a High-Level Architecture 
(HLA) compliant environment, and interfaces to real-world C4ISR systems, that the 
Services will populate with representations of their units and weapons systems.  Each 
Service has reoriented its next-generation training simulation effort into populating 
JSIMS with the relevant objects.  JSIMS Service components include the Warfighter 
Simulation 2000 (WARSIM 2000) for the Army, the National Air and Space [Warfare] 
Model (NASM) for the Air Force, JSIMS Maritime for the Navy and Marine Corps, the 
National Systems Simulation (NATSIM) for the National Reconnaissance Office, the 
WARSIM Intelligence Module (WIM) for tactical intelligence, and the Joint SIGINT 
Simulation (J-SIGSIM) for national signals intelligence.  DISA is the Executive Agent 
for C4ISR systems simulation, and DIA is responsible for foreign systems performance 
and behavior.  JSIMS IOC is set for Apr 2001, and FOC for Dec 2003.  http://www.jsims.mil 
 
Joint Warfare System (JWARS):  JWARS is under development to be a state-of-the-
art, constructive simulation that provides a multi-sided and balanced representation of 
joint theater warfare capable of use in analysis of planning and execution, force 
assessment, system effectiveness and trade-off analysis, and concept and doctrine 
development and assessment.  It will be a balanced warfare representation including C4, 
ISR and logistics and will focus on the operational level of war.  It will replace MIDAS 
and TACWAR.  The Limited IOC version is due in Mar 2000, Full IOC in May 2001 and 
FOC in FY 2002.  http://www.dtic.mil/jwars 
 
Laser Threat Analysis System (LTAS):  LTAS is a comprehensive computer modeling 
and simulation environment for assessing the operational impact of optical directed 
energy weapons and countermeasures.  LTAS encompasses the solution spectrum from 
physical process models through comprehensive threat engagement models. 
POC AFIWC/SAA, Jack Labo, jalabo@afiwc.osis.gov, 210-977-2427 
 
Missile Defense Space Tool (MDST), formerly Portable Space Model (PSM):  MDST 
provides the capability to support live and/or simulated exercises by injecting missile 
warning message sets into operational communications and simulation networks.  MDST 
contains real time models designed to provide a representation of the Defense Support 
Program, the Satellite Based Infrared System (SBIRS), and elements of the Theater Event 
System at a sufficient level of fidelity to support exercises while operating in real time.  It 
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provides theater commanders notification of theater ballistic missile launches via the 
Tactical Information Broadcast System (TIBS) and the Tactical Related Applications 
Data Dissemination System (TDDS).   
http://www.jntf.ssd.mil/bmdssc/PSM/PSM_SW_Spec.htm 
 
Model for Analysis of Sensor Coverage (MASC):  A Windows-based application for 
computing the terrain-masked line-of-sight (LOS) coverage of ground, air and space-
based sensors.  Ground-based and airborne sensor coverage can be displayed in 2 and 3D 
while satellite LOS coverage is displayed as a 2D map. 
POC NORAD, Dr. Murray Dixson, murray.dixson@peterson.af.mil, 719-554-3781 
 
National Air & Space Model (NASM):  NASM is the Air Force component of the Joint 
Simulation System (JSIMS).  It is the successor to the Air Warfare Simulation (AWSIM).  
NASM is developing the mission space objects (systems, organizations and procedures) 
JSIMS will use to provide the functional capability to represent the full range of 
aerospace power applications in a joint synthetic battle space for both Air Force specific 
and joint training.  Applications include training and readiness, education, doctrine 
development, situation assessment and the formulation, assessment and rehearsal of 
operational plans.  The IOC version of NASM will likely include a limited depiction of 
all satellites (basic orbital characteristics) and higher fidelity models of missile warning 
(DSP & SBIRS), navigation (GPS), some satellite communications and foreign space 
control.  By FOC the goal is to have fully integrated air and space in NASM & JSIMS. 
Version 1 (IOC) will be released March 2002 and the Air Force Full transition (AFFT) 
release will be September 2003 http://www.wg.hanscom.af.mil/NASM/overview.html 
 
Naval Simulation System (NSS):  NSS is an object-oriented, multiple-warfare and 
Monte Carlo simulation system.  NSS is also High Level Architecture (HLA) compliant.  
It represents command and control, communications, computer, intelligence, 
surveillance, reconnaissance (C4ISR) processes and systems in a fully integrated and 
comprehensive fashion.  This representation of C4ISR processes and systems specifically 
addresses: command structures and relationships; representation of operational plans; 
simulation of plan execution, including dynamic/responsive asset allocations; tactical 
picture generation; dissemination of surveillance products; and simulation of surveillance 
and intelligence product generation. 
POC Navy, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) 
 
NORAD Air Defense Model (NADM):  NADM is a PC-based, graphical strategic air 
defense simulation designed to estimate the outcomes of battles using specified threat 
scenarios and air defense architectures.  Used in NORAD analyses and to support cruise 
missile defense analyses and exercises. 
POC NORAD, Dr. Murray Dixson, murray.dixson@peterson.af.mil, 719-554-3781 
 
NORAD/USSPACECOM Communications Simulation System (NUCSS):  NUCSS 
replicates the communications string of the missile-warning component of Integrated 
Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA).  The model is maintained to reflect 
the current operational ITW/AA configuration.  It provides a performance audit of the 
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current ITW/AA system under different threat scenarios and stress events such as 
link/node outages and degradation of the communications links, provides a method to 
evaluate technical development of the system and to improve its performance and 
provides a road map for incorporating future mission capabilities into the ITW/AA 
communications system.  The simulation is able to federate under High Level 
Architecture with other models. 
POC NORAD, Dr. Roy Mitchell, roy.mitchell@peterson.af.mil, 719-554-3718 
 
Personal Computer Fighter Intercept Boundary (PCFIB) Model:  PCFIB is a PC-
based, graphical air sovereignty analysis model designed to determine intercept 
opportunities and locations for specified threats, surveillance systems, air bases, and 
interceptors.  PCFIB is used to assess the air sovereignty effectiveness of force 
architecture. 
POC NORAD, Dr. Murray Dixson, murray.dixson@peterson.af.mil, 719-554-3781 
 
Radio Frequency Mission Planner (RFMP):  RFMP provides the ability to evaluate 
jamming mission success for communications links.  RFMP is a DII-COE GCCS-M 
software program that provides a visualization of RF propagation.  RFMP integrates 
environmental variables and communication hardware statistics with RF propagation 
models to produce images that display geographical areas promoting RF 
reception/transmission/detection for use in mission planning.  By providing an interactive 
and visual environment, RFMP allows the operator to develop familiarity with the RF 
environment before a mission occurs by playing a variety of what-if scenarios. 
POC NIWA, Mr. Ernest Anastasi, anastasi@niwa.navy.mil, (202) 767-1493 
 
Satellite & Missile Analysis Tool (SMAT):  SMAT is a comprehensive 2-dimensional 
and 3-dimensional animated visual modeling tool for analysis of orbiting bodies, ballistic 
missile trajectories, and their relationship to the Earth. SMAT provides a fully modeled 
Earth with detailed geographic and political boundaries, has the capability to zoom and 
rotate the viewing position of the Earth, and provides accurate Sun position and 
illumination. Databases within SMAT contain the parameters for the Tactical 
Warning/Attack Assessment system, the Air Force Satellite Control Network, and the 
Space Surveillance Network sensors. SMAT allows complete control of all displayed 
sensor parameters, both ground and space-based, and allows importing, editing and 
saving of additional sensor parameters. SMAT provides the capability to model ballistic 
missile launch profiles, both strategic and theater, from any point on the surface of the 
Earth.  
POC: Ms. Kathy Gue, USAF/SWC/DOG (Space Warfare Center) kathleen.gue@swc.schriever.af.mil  
 
Satellite Navigation Accuracy Prediction Model (SNAPM):  SNAPM was built to 
evaluate Global Positioning System (GPS) accuracy as a function of constellation 
geometry, equipment status and natural environmental events.  The model is suitable for 
real-time evaluation of changing conditions experienced in a tactical warfighting 
environment.  SNAPM represents all system components and elements that affect GPS 
user accuracy and availability.  Applications include scenario evaluation/development, 
missile attack planning, aircraft operations planning and training.  When used as a 
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mission simulation tool, SNAPM allows the viewing of collective information pertinent 
for evaluating and planning tactical decisions such as sortie timing, attack locations and 
other offensive/defensive measures.  SNAPM output is presented on a workstation screen 
with colored hard copy available. SNAPM has been modified to run in a real-time 
constructive simulation environment, in both DIS and HLA environments, providing 
simulated GPS accuracies to other simulated systems. This instantiation of SNAPM also 
includes the ability to consider the impacts of GPS signal jamming/spoofing and weather 
effects. 
POC USSPACECOM, Mr. Dave Peck, william.peck@peterson.af.mil 
 
Satellite Tool Kit (STK):  STK 4.0 (basic) is a free commercial off-the-shelf product 
that provides sophisticated modeling functions for space- and ground-based objects, such 
as satellites, ships, aircraft and land vehicles.  Functions included in the free version of 
the software include vehicle propagation, determining visibility areas and times and 
computing sensor-pointing angles.  Free STK provides animation capabilities and a two-
dimensional map background for visualizing the paths of vehicles over time.  Results can 
be generated in both textual and graphical formats.  Additional modules can be purchased 
to provide enhanced computational and visualization capabilities.  In particular, STK's 
Visualization Option (STK/VO) provides dynamic three-dimensional display of STK 
scenarios.  A host of additional modules are available to provide detailed analyses for 
such tasks as determining satellite coverage over time, visibility related accesses for 
networks of objects, rapid analysis of close encounters between orbiting objects, realistic 
missile flight modeling, detailed modeling of radar systems and satellite communications 
link analysis.  It addresses mission planning, launch and ballistic missile flight.  STK is 
used to examine alternative deployments of satellites within constellations and analyze 
alternative coverage of combinations of satellites. 
POC Analytical Graphics, Inc., Mr. Doug Claffey, 610-578-1080 or 1-800-220-4STK 
 
Sensor Platform Allocation Tool (SPAAT):  SPAAT is an ISR force structure analysis 
tool.  It is a mixed integer program to select sensor architectures based on target coverage 
and cost constraints.  SPAAT is used to determine the optimal mix of sensors and 
platforms required to accomplish the reconnaissance and surveillance mission.  This 
optimization fits in the overall picture of the OODA (observe, orient, decide and act) loop 
at the orient/decide phase.  ISR optimization bounds the feasible region of the trade 
space.  An ISR mix that produces improved battle space knowledge can be fed into 
campaign or mission models to illustrate/quantify the military worth of ISR. 
POC: Maj Mark Hunter, USAF/AFSAA  
 
Space Command Optimization Utility Tool (SCOUT):  SCOUT is a Mixed Integer 
Program utilizing Goal Programming to solve a Capital Budgeting problem. The model 
produces an investment roadmap: a mix of concepts, current systems, and launches that 
maximizes both task coverage and military value while adhering to constraints on budget, 





Spacecraft Simulation Toolkit (SST):  The SST is an advanced, flexible development 
environment for the modeling of spacecraft and their environment.  The SST is based 
upon state-of-the-art simulation methods and accurate physical phenomenology.  It’s an 
object-oriented system consisting of software objects, which simulate the various systems 
and subsystems of the physical spacecraft.  The toolkit provides the ability to integrate 
the software objects together into a simulation of either a complete spacecraft system or a 
spacecraft subsystem.  The SST uses visual programming to allow the user access to 
spacecraft system, payload or subsystem models through pull-down menus and their 
connection into control structures required to implement a simulation.  The SST software 
objects provide algorithmic simulation of the various spacecraft functions.  The 
simulation databases provide the necessary knowledge base within which the detailed 
characteristics of the system are described as well as an orderly and efficient means to 
store the results of a simulation for additional analysis.  The interactive environment also 
provides integrated data analysis, software development tools and DIS interfaces with 
HLA interfaces currently under development.  A key feature of the SST is its flexibility 
to be reconfigured to meet a wide variety of requirements in engineering, simulation, 
operations and training.  Simulations that have been or are being developed include: Ultra 
Lightweight Imaging Technology Experiment (UltraLITE), Space-Based Radar (SBR) 
AMTI/GMTI, Global Positioning System (GPS), Hyperspectral Imaging (HSI), 
Advanced Geosynchronous Studies (AGS) and the Next Generation Space Telescope 
(NGST). 
POC Air Force Research Laboratory, Dr. Rich de Jonckheere, rich.dejonckheere@vs.afrl.af.mil, 505-846-
5054 
 
Spectral and In-band Radiometric Imaging of Targets and Scenes (SPIRITS):  
SPIRITS is used to support electronic combat (EC) analysis, EC weapon effectiveness, 
aircraft-weapon-sensor acquisition, research, test and evaluation, tactics development, 
mission planning and training.  SPIRITS is a simulation model used to scientifically 
predict the infrared signature of an aircraft under many operational conditions.  SPIRITS 
simulates the emission of IR radiation due to the exhaust plume, hot parts, aerodynamic 
heating, reflected radiation due to sunshine, earthshine, cloud shine and the atmosphere.  
Outputs provided are in-band radiant intensity, spectral radiant intensity and a spatial 
radiance map. 
POC AFIWC/DBE, Mr. Larry Oakes, 210-977-2057 
 
Strategic and Theater Attack Modeling Process (STAMP):  STAMP is a ballistic 
missile and space launch vehicle flight generator and engineering analysis tool.  It can 
model missile flights from launch to impact and present extensive flight characteristics 
and trajectory descriptions using a wide array of graphical and tabular outputs.  STAMP 
can also model numerous US and foreign space launch vehicles from launch to orbital 
insertion.   STAMP features an easy-to-use operator interface using windows and click-
type menu selections.   STAMP is driven by detailed engineering data bases, developed 
and approved by the appropriate intelligence agencies, which contain the parameters and 
values needed to model strategic and theater missiles as well as foreign space launch 
vehicles consistent with intelligence estimates.  Portions of STAMP have been integrated 
into the Satellite and Missile Analysis Tool (SMAT) to generate and process foreign 
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missile trajectories for SMAT users.  STAMP was developed by SAIC under the 
sponsorship of the Air Force National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC). 
 
Strategic and Theater Operations Research Model (STORM):  This simulation, the 
Synthetic Theater Operations Research Model (STORM), will support in-depth analysis 
of the campaign-level contributions of air and space power. It will provide a robust 
analytical capability to evaluate the contributions of air and space power in the context of 
military operations extended in time and space -- i.e., at the campaign level. Accordingly, 
NASM/AN is developing STORM, a multi-sided, object-oriented, stochastic computer 
simulation of military operations across the air, space, land, and maritime domains. The 
simulation is being designed and built expressly to examine issues involving the utility 
and effectiveness of air and space power in a theater-level, joint warfighting context. In 
addition, the NASM/AN Program exchanges modeling and computer science expertise 
with the training simulation community (NASM) and other Service and Joint analytical 
efforts, promoting the DoD goals of interoperability and re-use. Designed to capitalize on 
advances in both hardware and software environments, STORM is envisioned as a stand-
alone tool as well as a member of a federation. As a direct result of the development of 
STORM, the NASM/AN Program will provide NASM and the DoD M&S community at 
large with authoritative representations (objects) of air and space power in a campaign 
perspective.  IOC delivery of version 1.0 is December 2002.   
POC USAF/AFSAA http://www.s3i.com/STORM 
 
System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation (SEAS)2:  The System Effectiveness 
Analysis Simulation (SEAS) is a PC-hosted, many-on-many, stochastic, theater-wide, 
multi-mission-level model. It is typically used for military utility analyses of present and 
future space systems to explore combat outcome sensitivities to C4ISR (Command, 
Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) 
operational concepts and force structures.  By modeling the explicit causal link from 
sensor-to-shooter, SEAS is able to show the emergent non-linear behavioral impact of 
C4ISR on spatial/temporal maneuver and attrition of terrestrial forces.  SEAS 2 is a 
mission model in the AF analysis toolkit (AFSAT) at 
http://www.xo.hq.af.mil/xoc/xoca/afsat  
POC:  Capt Eric Frisco (USAF/SMC/XRDM)  Eric.Frisco@losangeles.af.mil 
 
Tactical Sensor Planner (TSP):  TSP models electronic warfare effects.  TSP 
graphically displays the EC environment to include order-of-battle, the effects of stand 
off jamming and self-protection jamming and the detection capabilities of ground-based 
radars.  Routes can be generated within TSP and color-coding the analysis points along 
the route shows an analysis of the flight routing.  The model displays line-of-sight (LOS) 
between threat location and target aircraft flying at any altitude.  Terrain masking effects, 
engagement envelope limits and radar parametrics condition the LOS. 
POC AFIWC/SAS, TSgt Justin Bolton, jwbolto@afiwc.osis.gov, 210-977-2729 
 
Thunder:  THUNDER is a stochastic, two-sided, analytical simulation of campaign-level 
military operations developed in the 1980s under the auspices of the Air Force Studies 
and Analyses Agency (AFSAA). The simulation was designed and built expressly to 
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examine issues involving the utility and effectiveness of air and space power in a theater-
level, joint warfare context. It provides insight into the full range of potential outcomes of 
a military campaign. THUNDER's ground war combat results were derived from 
deterministic play of US Army Concepts and Analysis Agency supplied data using the 
attrition calibration (ATCAL) process. THUNDER is a data driven model. Scenarios, 
force structure, terrain, and weapon systems are described in input data. Emphasis is 
placed on traceability of data back to intelligence/service documents or lower level model 
outcomes. THUNDER is a stochastic model, which supports Monte Carlo simulation and 
statistical inference.  Thunder is a campaign model in the AF analysis toolkit (AFSAT) at 
http://www.xo.hq.af.mil/xoc/xoca/afsat 
Model manager, Capt Thuan Tran  (USAF/AFSAA) thunder.modelmgr@pentagon.af.mil 
 
Target Prioritization for Links & Nodes (TPT-LN) {Formerly SIAM):  TPT-LN 
analyzes information flows on the battlefield to determine effects-based target priorities 
and information degradation from weapon use.  It models a network of sensors and 
shooters and the paths that connect them.  It displays communications paths, identifies 
choke points, prioritizes targets, analyzes strategies/courses of action, and identifies 
intelligence collection shortfalls.  It is an automated decision support tool to assess 
system vulnerabilities and plan for effective employment of air and space forces at the 
JTF and JFACC.  TPT-LN assists in ranking both terrestrial and space targets to produce 
an integrated Candidate Target List (CTL) and assessing the value of information to both 
Red and Blue commanders. 
POC Capt Brett Johnson USAF/SWC/DOY  
 
Warning:  Warning is a PC-based, graphical strategic ballistic missile warning analysis 
model designed to estimate warning time available to specified targets from launches 
made from specified geographic areas.  Its outputs can be interpreted as the probability 
that missiles fired from a particular area were detected and reported. 
POC NORAD, Dr. Murray Dixson, murray.dixson@peterson.af.mil, 719-554-3781 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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